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CRIMINAL LAW
TERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
THE MASS MEDIA: PERSPECTIVES,
PROBLEMS, PROPOSALS*
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI**
I. TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism may be described as a strategy of violence designed to
inspire terror within a particular segment of a given society.' Com-
monly associated with acts committed by ideologically and politically
motivated individuals in order to achieve power,2 terrorism is also com-
mitted by individuals who are not so motivated and by individuals act-
ing on behalf of states in time of war and peace.
3
* This article is an edited version of a report of the same title prepared by this author for
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, contract No. 79-N1-AX-0060.
The assistance of E. Charles Brabant, J.D., De Paul University, 1980, and John Evrard,
J.D., De Paul University, 1980; M.A., University of Chicago, 1971, is gratefully
acknowledged.
** Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law; Secretary General, International
Association of Penal Law, Paris; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences, Siracusa, Italy. SJ.D., George Washington National Law Center, 1973; LL.M.,
John Marshall Law Institute, 1966; J.D., Indiana University, 1964.
1 See Bassiouni, Prolegomenon to Terror Violence, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 745, 752 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Terror Violence]; Bassiouni, An International Control Schemefor the Prosecution of
International Terrorism: An Introduction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 485
(A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL ASPECTS].
2 Id.
3 During war, see, e.g., TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG (1947); Q. WRIGHT, HISTORY OF THE U.N.
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION (1947); Bassiouni & Nanda, War Crimes Prosecution, in 1 A TREA-
TISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (M.C. Bassiouni & V.P. Nanda eds. 1973) [herein-
after cited as INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw]. For war-related acts of terror-violence, see
also L. DAvIDowICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945 (1975); E. DAVIDSON, THE
TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966); Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W.
INT'L LJ. 207 (1979). For wars of independence, e.g., Biafra and Bangladesh, and for inter-
nal political control, see R. CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE
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The dramatic nature of so-called "terrorist" acts committed by
ideologically motivated individuals in the last decade has caused such
world wide concern that some regard it as le ma! due siecle. Nevertheless,
research has failed to probe this complex phenomenon sufficiently.
4
Above all, there is no agreed upon analytical methodology for the ap-
praisal of such conduct with a view to formulating appropriate measures
for its effective prevention and control.5 The pervasive and indiscrimi-
nate use of such convenient labels as terrorism continues to obscure the
field of inquiry.6 World attention often seems to focus only on individu-
ally perpetrated and ideologically motivated acts of terror-violence
while other terror-inspiring common crimes and brutal acts of state-
sponsored terror-violence go unnoticed.
7
The overt fear inspired in the public by terrorist acts may be, in the
absence of conclusive scientific data, attributable to the impact of media
coverage. The general public seems to perceive individual terrorism, as
opposed to state-sponsored terrorism, as a dangerous phenomenon af-
THIRTIES (1973); R. GAUCHER, THE TERRORISTS: FROM TSARIST's RUSSIA TO THE O.A.S.
(1978); S.T. HOMER, VIET CONG REPRESSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
(1970); A. PARRY, TERRORISM FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ARAFAT (1976); ZCJ. Report of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, 20 I.C.J. REv. 19 (June 1978); MacDermot, Crimes Against Humaniy in Ban-
gladesh, 7 INT'L LAW. 476 (1973).
4 Friedlander, Terrorism andInternational Law: What Is Being Done?, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 383,
384 (1977). Although there are numerous studies on the subject, they lack analytic consis-
tency and do not seem to have influenced decisionmakers and the general public.
5 See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER (1961); Mc-
Dougal, Lasswell & Chen, A FrameworkforPolig-Orientedlnquigy, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969).
The efforts of the world community ever since the proposed 1937 Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 23 (1938), have been
aimed at a substantive international convention on "terrorism" without a clear definition of
the term or understanding of its meaning and content. See Zlataric, Histoy of International
Terrorism and its Control, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 474 (M.C.
Bassiouni ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM]. For the U.N.'s con-
tinued efforts in that direction as well as in the search for the "causes" of terrorism, see U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. A/9028), U.N. Doc. A/C. 6L. 850 (1973); G. GUILLAUME & G. LEvAS-
SEUR, TERRORISME INTERNATIONAL (1977); A.F. PANZERA, ATrIVITA TERRORISTICHE E
DIRIrrTO INTERNAZIONALE (1978); Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON
L.J. 380 (1974); Franck & Lockwood, Preliminag Thoughts Toward an International Convention on
Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1974).
6 Consider the diversity of meanings given the political offense exception in extradition.
See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 370-428
(1974); I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 166-98 (1971); Lubet &
Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciag in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L.
& C. 193 (1980).
7 One need only compare media attention to the kidnapping and assassination of Italy's
Aldo Moro to the relatively limited coverage of genocide in Cambodia and Vietnam in the
past few years. See MacDermot, supra note 3. The exception that proves the rule is the Ira-
nian seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran in November of 1979 and the seizure of
diplomatic personnel. That ongoing crisis created by state-sponsored terror-violence received
more coverage than any other single event in the history of media coverage of terrorism.
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fecting society in a manner warranting exceptional action. The rela-
tively limited social harm resulting from acts commonly denominated
terrorism, when compared to the social harm caused by common crimes,
indicates that this psychological impact is more significant than the acts
of violence committed and that this impact may be more media-created
than intrinsic to the acts. The role of the media likewise would explain
in part the terrorist's choice of target and the manner of effecting the
act; the terrorist tailors both to insure media dissemination of both the
act and an underlying message to achieve terror-inspiring effect.
B. THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT OF NON-STATE-SPONSORED
INDIVIDUALLY PERPETRATED TERROR-VIOLENCE 8
A statistical study of terrorism commissioned by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency9 illustrates the problems associated with sensationalizing
terrorist events. The significance of the study is closely tied to the likeli-
hood that most people are unaware of how infrequent terrorist activity
is in comparison to other types of crime. 10 Researchers have shown that
when people are asked to judge the frequency with which an event
might occur, the availability of that event to their consciousness deter-
mines their estimate of frequency. By frequently focusing on terrorist
events, television and other media probably engender the feeling in the
viewing public that terrorist events are common and therefore more
dangerous than they really are.
In addition to discussing potential media effects on terrorists and
the public, the authors of the CIA report have drawn significant conclu-
sions from the data based on appraisal of the following statistics: (1) the
number of incidents of international terrorism and their geographic dis-
8 Most of the data that follows have been extracted from INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
IN 1978 (R.P. 79-10149) (CIA Nat'l Foreign Assessment Center, March 1979) [hereinafter
cited as CIA REPORT]. See also Mickolus, Statistical Approaches to the Stud of Terorism, in
TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPEcTIVES 212 (Y. Alexander & S. Ginger eds. 1977).
It is noteworthy that the statistics presented here are mostly from areas of the world
where a free press exists. This explains, at least in part, why some 90% of the reported acts of
international terrorism occur in the Western World. It does not mean that terror-violence
does not occur elsewhere, only that we do not know about it. The data also are based on an
arbitrary judgment of what is international, and therefore they do not indicate the extent of
national terrorism.
9 CIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. The study dealt only with individual terrorism having
an international element. As reliable as this study may be, a caveat bears repetition:
[T]he [data] should be treated with caution. The sharp rise in recorded terrorist inci-
dents over the past decade may reflect not only a real increase in such activity but also
more comprehensive and systematic reporting by the press. On the other hand, many
incidents probably have not been reported. . . . Moreover, the number of incidents
under review is so small that inadvertent omissions or erroneous classification could have
a numerically significant impact.
Id.
10 Kahneman & Wersky, On the Psychology of Predication, 80 PSYCH. REV. 273 (1973).
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tribution; (2) the number of casualties and their nationalities; and (3)
the categories of criminal acts comprising individually perpetrated ter-
ror-violence, and the trends in those activities.
Incidents. Where and How Many
Between 1968 and 1978, there were less than 3100 recorded inci-
dents of terror-violence." The total number of reported terrorist inci-
dents in 1978 was 353.12 This total rose from 279 incidents in 1977, yet
remained below the 413 incidents in 1976. Characteristic of the 1970s,
the 1978 figure indicates a persisting high level of terrorist activity rela-
tive to the overall level of recorded incidents during the later 1960s. The
1978 increase may be attributable to the expansion and exportation of
Middle Eastern terrorist activity to Western Europe.13 Geographically,
terrorist activity in 1978 continued trends of the last several years: the
most active arenas for terrorist operations remained the industrial de-
mocracies of North America and Western Europe and the politically-
tense atmospheres of Latin America and the Middle East. These regions
were the scene of over ninety percent of all terrorist incidents in the
decade spanning 1968 to 1978.14
Although the number of incidents in North America in 1978 de-
clined to a level about one-half that of just two years ago, 15 the tallies
over the decade indicate a fairly consistent level of terrorist operations in
the region. In the 1960s most incidents involved airplane hijackings'
6
claimed to have been committed for ideological reasons. The evidence
indicates, however, that psychopaths committed some of the hijack-
ings, 17 while common criminals whose sole purpose was personal gain
committed others. Among the many other ostensibly ideologically in-
spired incidents, few are truly characterizable as ideologically moti-
vated, and even fewer had a specific political goal, although clearly the
objective was frequently the dramatization of a particular claim or
grievance.
In Western Europe there were 166 incidents during 1978.18 This
11 CIA REPORT, ripra note 8, at I (Fig. 2). These incidents were encompassed within,
among others, the categories of hijacking, kidnapping; taking of civilian hostages; political
assassination; bodily harm in the context of kidnapping and attempted assassinations; and
bombings of public places and private residences.
12 Id. at 7 (Table 1).
13 Id. at 1.
14 Id. at 2 (Fig. 3).
15 In 1978, 19 incidents occurred in North America. Over the I1-year period, the average
was 26 incidents per year. Id. at 7 (Table 1).
16 See Evans, Airraft Hiwking, in LEGAL AsPEcTs, supra note 1, at 67.
17 See D. HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER: His FLIGHTS OF FANTASY (1971).
18 CIA REPORT, sufra note 8, at 7 (Table 1). The number of 1978 incidents in Western
Europe was 166, compared to the average of 35 from 1968 to 1971. Increased activity in
[Vol. 72
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number represents a marked increase over the level of incidents during
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Terrorist events in Europe often are
closely tied to internal political transformation along Marxist lines, as
were the activities of the Italian Red Brigades and their German coun-
terparts, such as the Baader-Meinhoff group. Other non-Marxist groups
engaging in terrorism include the Basque, Irish, Corsican, Croatian, and
Moluccan separatist movements.' 9
Consistent trends are more difficult to discern from the reported
data on terrorist activity scattered throughout the rest of the world. Ex-
cept for regions where terrorist incidents are rare and comprise only a
small part of global international terrorism,20 there appears to be no
reliable pattern. The explosiveness of the political climates of Latin
America and the Middle East has fostered terrorist activity in those re-
gions at a level disproportionate to the size of their respective popula-
tions. Yet even though the situation in these regions has remained more
or less constant, there have been marked fluctuations in the level of ter-
rorist activity from year to year.
21
Western Europe between 1972 and 1978 has raised the average to about 150 incidents per
year, with never less than 100 for any given year during that time span. Id.
19 No comprehensive study is known to this author on the correlation between Marxist
and non-Marxist movements. However, the legal literature and general information on this
subject is abundant with respect to any one of these organizations and movements and sup-
ports this conclusion. Seegeneraly Y. ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (1975); A. BURTON, URBAN TERRORISM (1976); S.
SARKESIAN, REVOLUTIONARY GUERILLA WARFARE (1975); A. SCHMID & J. DE GRAFF, IN-
SURGENT TERRORISM AND THE WESTERN NEWS MEDIA: AN EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS
WITH A DUTCH CASE STUDY (1980); P. WILKINSON, POLITICAL TERRORISM (1975).
20 During 1968-78, terrorist activity in the U.S.S.R. and socialist Eastern Europe repre-
sented 0.4% of total worldwide incidents, while Sub-Saharan Africa was 3.7%, Asia 5.6%, and
Oceania 0.6%. CIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 7 (Table 1). On the question of hijacking in the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, see Zwirboul & Chupilov, La Capture fIlicite d'Aeronefs, 47 RE-
VUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PEN.AL 295 (1976), and the reports of Buchala (Poland),
Plawski (Poland), Dolensky (Czechoslovakia), Antoniou and Iliescov (Rumania), and
Filpovic (Yugoslavia) in that issue.
21 Latin America witnessed 61 incidents of terrorism in 1978, in comparison to 46 such
events in 1977, 105 in 1976, and 48 in 1975. CIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 7 (rable 1). The
Mideast'was somewhat more consistent, reporting 61 incidents in 1978. Id. Mideast terrorist
activity is almost exclusively related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. See M.C. Bassiouni,
The Palestinian's Right to Self-Determination and National Independence (A.A.U.G. Infor-
mation Paper No. 22, Dec. 1978). Such activity in Latin America is, by contrast, essentially
of internal political origin, despite some exportation to other countries in the region for
broader ideological reasons. The two regions may be crucially different since terrorism in the
Mideast is a product of a known conflict, which can be expected to abate with the advent of a
just and peaceful solution, while the multiplicity of sources in Latin America would seem to
preclude that prospect and even exacerbate the problem. It is also noteworthy that the aggre-
gate of reported Mideast incidents in 11 years is 492, or 16% of worldwide activity. CIA
REPORT, supra note 8, at 7 (Table 1). That figure may be misleading, however, as the arbi-
trary, fine line between incidents of local and international character may exclude some inci-
dents of non-international importance. Furthermore, these statistics "exclude the
1981]
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Victims.* Who and How Many
In 1978 the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist incidents
doubled from the previous year's level while injuries remained con-
stant.2 2 Although it is not clear whether the high levels of the mid-1970s
will recur in the near future, the number of victims remains at levels
significantly higher than those of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
2 3
A comparison between victim nationality24 and regional distribu-
tion of incidents reveals that, while the percentage of Middle Eastern
and Western European victims corresponds to the level of terrorist activ-
ity in each region, no such correlation exists in Latin and North
America. Latin America has been the site of 26.6% of all terrorist inci-
dents over the eleven-year period from 1968 to 1978,25 but its nationals
comprised only 13.9% of the victims. 26 Conversely, only 9.7% of all inci-
dents occurred in North America during the same period,2 7 but its na-
tionals comprised 41.9% of total casualties.2 8 One factor partially
explaining this discrepancy is that North American nationals are fre-
quently the victims of Latin American terrorist events.
Criminal Acts: What Kinds and What Trends
For statistical purposes, government analysts reduced the kinds of
terrorist incidents to ten categories: kidnapping, barricade-hostage, let-
ter bombing, incendiary bombing, explosive bombing, armed attack, hi-
jacking, assassination, theft, break-in, and sniping.
Bombing, both incendiary and explosive, has been utilized the most
by terrorists, accounting for over 60% of all worldwide incidents during
the eleven years.29 Letter bombing, having reached a 1972 peak of
ninety-two incidents, dwindled to five incidents in 1978.30 Except for
assassinations and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, unless
those incidents either victimized noncombatant nationals of states outside the principal area
of conflict or became the object of international controversy." Id. at 7.
22 Between 1968 and 1978, international terrorism caused 2,102 deaths and 5,078 injuries.
CIA REPORT, supra note 8, at ii (Fig. 1). Deaths and injuries due to terrorist incidents in 1978
amounted to approximately 450 fatalities and over 400 injuries. Id.
23 Injuries for the years 1968-71 averaged about 200 per year and fatalities averaged
about 60 per year. Id. For the years 1974-76, injuries averaged about 845 per year and
fatalities averaged about 375 per year. Id.
24 In a substantial number of cases the nationality of the victim is that of the state in
which the incident took place, but no extensive data is available on the subject.
25 CIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 7 (Table 1).
26 Id. at 4 (Fig. 5).
27 Id. at 7 (Table 1).
28 Id. at 4 (Fig. 5).
29 Id. at 6 (Fig. 6).
30 Id. at 8 (Table 3).
[Vol. 72
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assassination, which appears to fluctuate greatly year to year,3 1 the re-
maining types of criminal acts have been utilized consistently by ter-
rorists in their operations.
The CIA study suggested the following trends for the future of in-
ternational terrorism: 3 2 (1) The nature and intensity of terrorist vio-
lence will fluctuate relatively widely; (2) the composition and character
of the groups engaged in international terrorist activity will continue to
change and increase in number; (3) regional patterns of victimization
and location of operations will remain unchanged; (4) representatives of
affluent countries, particularly government officials and business execu-
tives, will continue to be the primary targets for assassination and kid-
napping; and (5) the majority of incidents will continue to involve
bombings and incendiary attacks, although overcoming present tactical
and technological limitations may permit use of more sophisticated de-
vices such as heat-seeking missiles and similar "stand-off" weapons.
33
The foregoing shows that the actual harm resulting from interna-
tional terrorism in its present manifestations is not quantitatively signifi-
cant when compared to other crimes, nor is it a threat to civilization or
to the survival of some states as has been proposed. However, the
number, frequency, and intensity of terrorist acts within the national
context are far more significant than those characterized as "interna-
tional."3 4 Internal rather than international terrorism produces the
greatest quantitative harm, and state-sponsored terror-violence is ex-
ceedingly more harmful and more threatening to the stability of world
order than non-state-sponsored individual or small group terror-vio-
31 In 1968 and 1969, less than ten assassinations were perpetrated by terrorists. The
number of assassinations in 1973, 1976, 1977, and 1978 were, respectively, 18, 48, 23, and 29.
Id. at 8 (Table 3). However, this does not include political assassinations that do not have an
international element.
32 Id. at 1, 5.
33 See airo Jenkins & Rubin, New Vulnerabilities and the Acquisition of New Weapons by Non-
Government Groups, in LEGAL ASPECTs, supra note 1, at 221.
34 For example, Italy has suffered an estimated 4800 kidnappings in the last five years,
and the number of persons killed in bombings in the Irish conflict in the last five years is
estimated at more than two thousand, while those killed in the Basque conflict in Spain
exceeded 200 in the last two years, and political kidnappings and assassinations in some South
and Latin American nations since 1970 have been in the thousands. In Brazil in 1979 some
976 persons were assassinated:- If one is to also include in this category the consequences of
major internal conflicts, such as in Lebanon where between 1977 and 1979 an estimated
70,000 casualties occurred, or the conflict in Cyprus which between 1976 and 1978 is esti-
mated to have produced 15,000 casualties, then the quantitative significance of this aspect of
the phenomenon increases significantly. Furthermore, if one considers the consequences of
state-sponsored terrorism as has occurred in Biafra and Bangladesh, where each conflict took
an estimated toll of one million lives, and the estimated three million Cambodians killed by
the Pol Pot regime of Democratic Kampuchea between 1977 and 1979, and the untold
number of persons killed or expelled from Vietnam and Cambodia, the quantitative results
are staggering. [The author drew the above summary from a number of new sources.-Ed.]
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lence. Nevertheless, the public perceives individual terrorism in its in-
ternational manifestations as the more serious threat, and some states
regard internal individual terrorism as the more threatening factor to
their existence and effective functioning. Both reactions tend to produce
inordinate overreactions which may bring about stricter laws to combat
terrorism and even repressive measures that threaten democratic institu-
tions. In non-democratic systems such measures may simply become a
means for further oppression and, ironically, state-sponsored terrorism.
In either case, terrorism affects the quality of life, destabilizes social, eco-
nomic, and political institutions, precipitates a climate of fear and un-
rest,3 5 and finally disrupts minimum world public order. To achieve
these ends, the terrorist seeking power relies on the psychological impact
of his acts rather than their immediately destructive consequences.
Because the actual destructive consequences of terrorism are less
than those of other types of crime, it is not advocated that there be re-
duced concern about the phenomenon. This article intends to convey a
sense of perspective, and to lay a foundation for the proposition that the
media's created impact plays a more significant role in the public's per-
ception than otherwise recognized. That role is not due exclusively to
improper or improvident media coverage of such incidents, but also to
insufficiently addressed psychological phenomena. Thus a key word
used in the media may after repeated usage evoke not only its literal
meaning, but also bear a factually unfounded connotation serving as a
prediction about the event with which it is associated. Such an effect
tends to increase the various psychological effects of terror-violence by
their ready recall and projected impact. It should be borne in mind that
very little data is available on the subject of terrorism and the mass
media. To that extent, therefore, it is difficult to determine what legisla-
tive policy should be developed and what specific measures are neces-
sary to control it.
C. CLASSIFICATIONS OF PERPETRATORS AND THE LEGAL CONTEXT
OF THEIR ACTS
Terrorists undoubtedly act from complex motives. Although rigid
classification of their motivation must be therefore somewhat artificial,
it is nevertheless useful for analytical purposes to identify four basic cat-
egories: (1) common criminals motivated by personal gain; (2) persons
acting as a consequence of a psychopathological condition; (3) persons
seeking to publicize a claim or redress an individual grievance; and (4)
ideologically motivated individuals.
3 6
35 See Terror Violence, supra note 1.
36 See id. at 755-56. See aso THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM 6 (1977) (from a seminar spon-
[Vol. 72
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The last category more than the others seems to fascinate writers,
terrify the public, and intrigue the media.37 Seeking to confer upon
themselves a special status by virtue of their purported adherence to
higher political or ideological values, these actors, however, engage in no
more than comn-ion crimes seldom justified by the ordinary principles of
criminal responsibility.38 The ideologically motivated offender seeks to
accomplish an ideological or political objective by means which are un-
lawful, presumably because no other effective legal means are available
to accomplish his goal.39 That proposition has become the cornerstone
of an entire rationalization process for the use of violence. The contem-
porary ideologically motivated offender frequently claims to be acting in
self-defense, by reason of necessity, or under compulsion. In some in-
stances the perpetrator claims to be the victim of a system which left
him no viable alternative.
These claims appear valid only for those willing to give the system
some color of legitimacy. Others who simply regard the system as ille-
gitimate claim that their resort to violence is equivalent to measures
taken by duly constituted authorities against outlaws. Accepting the
premise of illegitimacy, the logic of this justification is flawless. As val-
ues and perceptions change, so does the concept of terror-violence.
Thus, what is terrorism to some is heroism to others.40
Ideologically motivated actors frequently perceive themselves as
"justice-makers." They consider their action, even when abhorrent to
them, to be dictated by circumstances beyond their control or condi-
tioned by the limitations imposed upon them by virtue of their inherent
political weakness. The gradual transformation which such individuals
sored by The Chicago Sun- Times and Chicago Daily News) (remarks of M. Cherif Bassiouni). See
generally F. HACKER, CRUSADERS, CRIMINALS, CRAZIEs: TERROR AND TERRORISM IN OUR
TIME (1977).
37 See Terror Violence, supra note 1, at 759-65; Cooper, Terrorism and the Media, 24 CHrmY'S
L.J. 226 (Sept. 1976); Paust, Internal Law and Control of the Media" Terror, Repression, and the
Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621 (1978).
38 M.C. BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF DISSENT AND RIOTS 57 (1971).
39 See Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Ofenses and the Political Ofense Exception in Extradition:
A ProposedJudicial Standard for an Unruy Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 217 (1968); Pisapia,
Terrorimo: Delitto Politico 0 Delitto Commune?, LAGGIUSTIZIA PENALE 1 (V-VI, Maggio 1975).
40 Recall that war in defense against aggression or in opposition to foreign occupation is
deemed justifiable, although the use of violence in such circumstances remains subject to
express rules which exclude certain kinds of targets and means of violence. See generally A.
RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1979). On international controls, see Bassiouni, Meth-
odological Options for International Legal Control of Terrorism, 7 AKRON LJ. 388 (1974); Fried-
lander, Sowing the Wi. Rebellion and Violence in Theog and Practice, DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 89,
92 (1976). As to the laws of war, see 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, and
note 44 infla. See also the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol thereto, particularly the enforcement provisions of Protocol I, Articles 73-79,
commented upon in Bassiouni, The Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions Under the Draft
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 185 (1976).
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undergo before resorting to forms of terror-violence evidences that be-
lief. Within this category of ideologically-motivated actors the process
appears almost always the same:
1. heightened perception of oppressive conditions-whether real or imag-
inary;
2. recognition that such conditions are not the immutable order of
things, but amenable to active reform;
3. that action designed to promote change is not forthcoming;
4. that one must at last resort to violence;
5. that such action need not be successful, but only contribute to setting
in motion a series of events enlisting others and leading to change (a
realization that dissemination of the cause is more important than suc-
cess of the action);
6. that the individual's self-sacrifice outweighs the guilt borne by com-
mitting a violent act (thus violence without guilt);
7. that the cause transcends the need to rationalize the act of violence
(the self-gratification merges with the higher purpose).
This transformation of consciousness is accompanied by two additional
conditions:
8. the ethnocentricity of the values opposed to the desired change justifies
the same arrogant ethnocentricity of values of the actor (thus polariza-
tion of values without a mechanism for reconciliation by virtue of evo-
lutionary and participatory social change leads to violence);
9. the absence of resocialization of actors who do not conform to social
norms stigmatizes them and prevents reintegration into society, which
further radicalizes them and leads to increased violence.
Individuals motivated in the manner described are willing to take
risks and bear personal sacrifice to a far greater extent than the more
calculating common criminal motivated by personal gain. On the other
hand, distinguishing between ideologially motivated actors and psycho-
pathological individuals, who may manifest the same characteristics, is
more difficult. This similarity may explain why frequently the media
depict and the public perceives both actors as ruthless, brutal psycho-
paths.
4 1
41 Surprisingly, however, societies and the organs of states, which are so prompt and per-
emptory in their denunciation of terrorism when committed by individuals against a consti-
tuted political order, react with less intensity when the political order engages in similar or
more outrageous conduct against individuals. See note 3 supra. Certain social injustices have
historically been corrected only through violence. Throughout the history of decolonization,
violence has frequently triggered political change. In some cases, violence reached the pro-
portions of limited war in order to achieve a political result. This was the case with Algeria
and Vietnam. Finally, in part as a consequence of the first two phenomena, acts of terror-
violence have shown a tendency to become self-legitimizing. Thus, anti-colonial violence was
at its inception invariably condemned and repressed, but gained grudging recognition as its
intensity increased, until finally erstwhile terrorists became acclaimed heroes, honored per-
haps even by their former foe . Unfortunately, the lessons of the colonial period have not
been lost on the leaders of contemporary urban guerrillas to whom the process is the same.
They use the same strategies aimed at producing parallel results: the social, political, and
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Individuals engaging in acts of terror-violence, however motivated,
afortiori commit common crimes subsumed in such categories as mur-
der, assault, battery, kidnapping, robbery, theft, and extortion. Actions
falling within these classes constitute crimes in violation of the criminal
laws of every stite in the world.42 Special national legislation therefore
appears unnecessary unless research demonstrates compelling circum-
stances.43 Similarly, special legislation proscribing terror-violence in the
context of war, whether of an international or non-international charac-
ter (a war of national liberation), is unnecessary because such acts are
proscribed already by the law of armed conflict and international con-
ventions.44 It is difficult to explain why the world community continues
to clamor for more international conventions on the subject of terrorism
in time of peace when existing conventions cover piracy,45 hijacking,
46
kidnapping of diplomats, 47 and civilian hostage-taking. 48 Although in-
sufficiently recognized by the media, the most promising means of deter-
ring terrorism is effective enforcement and implementation of these
existing conventions and, particularly, greater cooperation between
economic transformation of the constituted public order. Their claims frequently linked, al-
beit remotely, to some valid grievance, they proceed by the paradox that they must destroy to
build. Ironically, their goals are frequently met, for either reform or change occurs or repres-
sion takes hold and supports their indictments. It is not surprising that the saying of Mao
Tse-Tung "Truth comes out of the barrel of a gun," has been so widely adopted by urban
guerrillas. See M.C. BAssIouNI, spra note 38; A. BURTON, supra note 19; S. SARKESIAN, suPra
note 19; P. WILKINSON, supira note 19.
42 This conclusion was reached after an examination of the laws of 53 countries relating to
terrorism in connection with a study by the American Society of International Law. The
outcome is published in LEGAL ASPEcTs, supra note 1.
43 For example, Congress might enact special legislation were it common for the media to
detail the vulnerability of likely targets of terror-violence. Special legislation might also be
appropriate if research showed that terrorist murders were more likely to incite additional
violence than common criminal murders.
44 The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, apply to both types of conflict and
prohibit acts of terror-violence, as does the 1909 Hague Convention on the Customary Laws
of Armed Conflicts. See Terror Violence, supra note 1, at 750 & n.17.
45 The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52-
55 (1958).
46 The 1963 Tokyo Convention, the 1970 Hague Convention, and the 1971 Montreal
Convention. For discussion of them, see Evans, Aircraft and Aviation Facilities, in LEGAL As-
PEcTs, supra note 1, at 3; Evans & Lee, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 219-
84. See also 47 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr PENAL (pts. 3-4) (1976).
47 The 1972 O.A.S. Convention and 1974 U.N. Convention. For their discussion, see
Murphy, The Role of International Law in the Prevention of Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Person-
nel, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 285; Murphy, Protected Personr andDiplo-
matic Facilities, in LEGAL AsPEcTs, supra note 1, at 277.
48 Ad-Hoc Committee on the Drafting of An International Convention Against the Tak-
ing of Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 188/L.2, 188/L.3 (1977). The International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages was adopted 13 December 1979, U.N. GAOR (XXXIV),
A/34/819.
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states in the areas of extradition 49 and penal matters.50
D. THE FUTURE OF NON-STATE-SPONSORED INDIVIDUALLY
PERPETRATED TERROR-VIOLENCE
One commentator has argued that the existing balance of terror
produced by nuclear weaponry has rendered conventional war, such as
World War II, an unlikely occurrence. 5' Changing world attitudes also
offer the prospect of a reduction in the frequency and intensity of lim-
ited warfare. However, non-international violence is likely to increase in
states in which the social, economic, and political structures do not per-
mit the peaceful coexistence of disparate races, tribes, religions, or na-
tionalities. This trend is evident in the conflicts in Cyprus, Lebanon,
Ireland, and the Basque region of Spain. Likewise, non-international
violence is likely to increase in fairly homogeneous societies in which
certain social, economic, and political inequality is prevalent, and where
the structures of the constituted order resist changes needed to satisfy
internal dissent. Italy's extreme left and right, Germany's Baader-
Meinhoff Group, and the Red Liberation Army, whose counterparts ex-
ist also in Japan, are products of these cultural tensions. Unwilling or
unable to work within their respective systems to achieve peaceful evolu-
tionary transformation, these groups resort to terror-violence.
Whether manifesting in a homogeneous or heterogeneous culture,
non-international violence challenges the ability of democratic institu-
tions to meet the legitimate demands of rising expectations. The ability
of such institutions to permit, if not to foster, peaceful evolutionary
change will determine whether terror-violence is perceived as a viable
alternative. President Kennedy expressed this truth somewhat more
succinctly: "Those who make peaceful evolution impossible, make vio-
lent revolution inevitable." A broad-based popular tolerance of terror-
ist-violence is indispensable to its survival. If political institutions
provide for the needed change, then violence is avoidable.
The United States' experience with slavery provides an excellent
example of the delicate balance between institutional sensitivity and vi-
olence. No greater injustice existed in American history than slavery
and the sequel of racism. By the 1960s violence became the last resort
for black Americans. 52 However, led by a far-sighted judiciary5 the sys-
49 Seegeneral'y M.C. BASsiOuNI, supra note 6; 39 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PE-
NAL 375 (1968).
50 See 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3. See also 45 REVUE INTERNATIO-
NALE DE DROrr PENAL 405 (1974).
51 See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1965).
52 M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 38, at 25 el seq.
53 Id.; Bassiouni, Le Role dujuge aux Eats-Unis, 46 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr
[Vol. 72
TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA
tern responded positively, if inadequately, and thereby lessened the po-
tential for racial violence. States in which social needs and values
change without a corresponding response by the political system become
fertile grounds for the seeds of terror-violence. Acts of terrorism in these
states, whether national or international in their scope and effect, are
likely to increase dramatically in the next decade. In that climate of
social transformation, and occasional upheaval, both the mass media
and law enforcement agencies will encounter their greatest challenges.
These two institutions will be prone to conflict with one another, but
their cooperation is essential to reducing the impact and spread of ter-
ror-violence.
The prospect that the comparatively limited yet increasing harm of
terror-violence will replace conventional warfare in the 1980s in either
of the two cultural contexts described above is to some extent consoling.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the extent of the damage this new
form of urban violence may inflict.54 It is probable that the incidence
will increase, that new and more dramatic acts are likely to occur, and
that these acts will cause great harm.
Never have contemporary democracies faced a greater and more
enigmatic challenge than the increased violence, whether termed "ter-
rorism" or "common criminality," which has become so characteristic of
urban industrialized societies.55 The reactions of organized societies are
likely to incline toward excessively repressive measures. As the world
community seeks to "thicken the veneer of civilization" 56 by promoting
concern for human rights, 57 the opposing forces of violence and repres-
sion could endanger the few gains attained since the end of World War
II. The vigilance of jurists as keepers of the law must therefore be in-
creased. And along with the legal profession, those entrusted with the
powerful tool of the mass media must bear a significant share of this
PENAL 37 (1976). To the extent that the potential for terror-violence has declined in the
United States, the need for carefully drawn legislation confining media activity during ongo-
ing terrorist incidents is heightened.
54 Paust, Response to Terrorism: A Prologue to Decision Concerning Pivate Measures of Sanrtion, 12
STAN. J. INT'L L. STUD. 79 (1977); Paust, Private AMeasures of Sanction, in LEGAL ASPE-rs, supra
note 1, at 575-612.
55 Crime Prevention and Control Report of the Secretary-General on Crime Trends in the
World, U.N. Doc. A/32/199 (1977).
56 Bassiouni, Human Rights Program.. The Veneer of Civilization Thickens, 21 DE PAUL L. REV.
271 (1971).
57 See, e.g., P. GRAVEN, PROBLEMS DE PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DROrrS DE
L'HOMME (vol. 1, 1969); P. GRAVEN, LE DIFFICILE PROGRES DU REGNE DE LA JUSTICE ET
DE LA PAIX INTERNATIONALES PAR LE DROrr (vol. 2, 1970); D. PONCET, LA PROTECTION DE
L'AccUsE PAP LA CONVENTION EUROPEENE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (1977); A.H. ROB-
ERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1978); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTE-TION oF'HUMAN RIGHTS (1973); 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 271 (1971) (symposium issue
on human rights).
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social responsibility. 58 In societies which cherish freedom of the press,
the media must not allow themselves to become an instrument of terror-
violence. Conversely, in those societies that effectively control the press
and engage in government sponsored terror-violence, the media must
react boldly against it.59 In considering the impact of mass dissemina-
tion, media managers must evaluate their decisions to publish or broad-
cast in light of these two imperatives. Their role and that of law
enforcement, both in the public interest, can best be served by increased
cooperation and understanding of their respective obligations and con-
straints.
II. PROBLEMS IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF NON-STATE-SPONSORED
INCIDENTS OF TERROR-VIOLENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The media are indispensable communications links of industrial so-
ciety. They are as much a part of that society's needs as energy. From
their economic and utilitarian function to their sociopolitical role, the
media are indispensable social links of modern societies. With the con-
stant developments in electronic technology, the speed and geographic
scope of mass communications continues to increase.
Escalation in global terror-violence incidents since the 1960s corre-
sponds to these innovations in technology enabling the media to dissem-
inate information faster and to vastly augmented audiences. The
relationship between terrorism and the media appears to be symbiotic:
perpetrators of acts of terror-violence rely on the media to serve their
terror-inspiring purposes and the media utilize such incidents as re-
warding news items.60 The problems addressed herein are necessarily
more peculiar to the electronic than the print media. It is essential to
recognize, however, that conclusive evidence of the terrorist-media rela-
tionship has not heretofore been presented.
6'
58 Salomone, Trrorism and the Mass-Media, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, Supra note 5,
at 43.
59 Paust, supra note 37. See notes 60-123 & accompanying text infia for a discussion of the
media as an instrument for terror-violence and the first amendment implications of regula-
tion of the media during terrorist incidents.
60 Teror Violence, supra note 1, at 760. Dr. Frederick Hacker, a California psychiatrist with
experience as a terrorism negotiator, has remarked that: "If the mass media did not exist,
terrorists would have to invent them. In turn, the mass media hanker after terroristic acts
because they fit into their programming needs: namely, sudden acts of great excitement that
are susceptible, presumably, of quick solution. So there's a mutual dependency." Hickey,
Terrorism and Television, TV GUIDE, July 31, 1976. Walter Laquer has called the media the
"terrorist's best friend." Id.
61 While it is difficult to design and perform research in this area, some studies suggest
that media coverage exerts a positive influence on terrorist activity and others indicate that
the effect is negative, i.e., that the media has a cathartic effect on the occurrence of subse-
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Irrespective of whether the acts of terror-violence are committed by
individuals against a state or are state-sponsored acts committed against
individuals, terrorism seems invariably to involve the instrumentaliza-
tion of the media. In that respect terrorism from "below" (non-state-
sponsored) and terrorism from "above" (state-sponsored) share the same
means and methods to disseminate or prevent the dissemination of their
terror-inspiring message. As such it may be more advantageous at times
for the purposes of terrorism from above to reduce media exposure of
repressive violence. In the case of the serious state-sponsored violations
of human rights, such as torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions, the
state may well use all of its powers to prevent the dissemination of such
news. On the other hand, in acts such as the Iranian seizure of the
United States Embassy in November, 1979, the perpetrators intend to
focus maximum world attention on the underlying concerns which mo-
tivate the action.
The agents of individual acts of terror-violence will more often than
not seek to propagandize their claims to achieve maximum publicity.
Ideologically motivated terror-violence from below is the weapon of the
weak.62 It is employed by those too few or too powerless to achieve their
objectives through conventional sociopolitical processes. Media technol-
ogy has made terror-violence an attractive mechanism for social or polit-
ical transformation by providing a device by which individuals can
appear powerful within a short period of time, with relatively little effort
and in the context of an increasingly vulnerable society.
6 3
quent terrorist events. See, e.g., Berkowitz & McCauley, The Contagion of Criminal Violence, 34
SOCIOMETRY 238 (1971); Liebert & Schwarzgerg, Effeis of Mass Media, 1977 ANN. REV.
PSYCH. 141; Phillips, Suicide, Motor Vehicle Fatalities, and the Mass Media: Evidence Toward a
Theoy of Suggestion, 1979 AM. J. Soc. 1050.
62 B. CROZIER, A THEORY OF CONFLICT 129 (1974). See generally text accompanying
notes 39-40 supra.
63 Industrialization has provided such vulnerable and attractive targets as aircraft, elec-
tric power plants, nuclear reactors, dams, fuel storage facilities, telephone exchanges, while
terrorists have obtained-through theft, purchase, and support from patron states-portable
and sophisticated weapons of great destructive capability. See THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM,
supra note 36, at 7. See also note 33 supra. The great modem threat is the theft or use of
nuclear materials. See M. WILRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFE-
GUARDS (1974).
The mass media include television, radio, newspapers, magazines, books, and films. For
the purposes of this discussion, "media" refers primarily to the news organizations commonly
associated with the first four media categories.
That the media have come to serve-willingly or unwillingly-the purposes of those who
engage in terror-violence was expressed by the National Task Force on Disorders and Terror-
ism where it states:
Acts of terrorism have gained immediacy and diffusion through television, which con-
veys the terrorist message to millions worldwide. The modem terrorist has been quick to
exploit this advantage; he has become a master of the medium in a way that shows
government as a poor rival. Formerly, in countries where free speech and communica-
tion were jealously guarded rights, it would have been unthinkable for violent subver-
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However balanced coverage is, problems of pervasive influence re-
main, which are of course compounded when the coverage is unbal-
anced. To some extent, the very function of the media in society
condemn them to be the medium of the terrorist's message. 6 4 The mass
media perform five basic functions:
65
1. Informational, by providing increasing numbers of people with a flow of
news events;
2. Judgmental, by providing the public with standards of judgment for
interpreting the information which is conveyed explicitly or implicitly
by selection and treatment of subjects and material;
3. Educational, by transmitting the social and cultural heritage from one
generation to the next, and by defining and clarifying social goals and
social values;
4. Interactional, by furnishing a basis from which both individual and col-
lective judgments can be formed and ideas exchanged;
5. Entertainment, by providing amusement and relieving tension.
Although the literature has devoted increasing attention to the rela-
tionship between terror-violence and the media,66 specific solutions to
the problems it creates have thus far been limited. The remainder of
this section seeks to contribute to understanding some of the problems
presented by media coverage of terror-violence incidents. The next sec-
tion will seek to develop some specific proposals to limit the effects of
such problems in order to enhance the prevention and control of terror-
violence within the framework of constitutional principles and the rule
of law.
B. THE PUBLICITY OBJECTIVE OF TERROR-VIOLENCE
Implicit in the definition of terrorism is a psychological element.
6 7
Ideologically motivated terror-violence produces a psychological impact
sives to have seized control of the organs of mass communications. Today it is a
commonplace consequence of terrorist action. In many ways, the modem terrorist is the
very creation of the mass media. He has been magnified, enlarged beyond his own pow-
ers by others.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS AND TERRORISM 9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DISOR-
DERS AND TERRORISM].
64 See, e.g., J. BELL, A TIME OF TERROR 110 (1978); DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, supra
note 63, at 236-38, 366-69, 387-90, 401-04, 414; INSTITUTE FOR STUDY OF CONFLICT, TELE-
VISION AND CONFLICT (1978) [hereinafter cited as TELEI SION AND CONFLICT]; THE MEDIA
AND TERRORISM, supra note 36; Alexander, Ter-orirm, the Media and the Police, 32 J. INT'L AFF.
101 (1978); Hickey, supra note 60; Hickey, The Medium in the Middle, TV GUIDE, August 7,
1976; MORE, June, 1977, at 12-21; Revzin, A Reporter Looks at Media Role in Terror Threats, Wall
St. J., March 14, 1977, at 16; Seib, The Rana# Episode: A Media Event, Washington Post,
March 18, 1977, at A27; The National News Council, Paper on Terrorism (July, 1977) (un-
published). See also note 37 supra.
65 Terror Violence, supra note 1, at 752.
66 Id. at 758.
67 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supa.
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exceeding the actual harm caused. Sporadic acts of violence by them-
selves are of limited utility in producing terrorist objectives. The ideo-
logically motivated terrorist seeks, therefore, to enhance the effect of
these acts by publicizing them as widely as possible. The terrorist de-
pends upon the mass media to disseminate the sociopolitical message
and the terror-inspiring nature of the act performed. This terror-inspir-
ing quality is not necessarily intrinsic to the act, but rather is derivative
of its impact, which in turn is largely determined by the coverage it
receives from the media.68
The media thus play an important role in shaping the three stages
of ideologically motivated terrorism: 69
1. the primary stage in which the tactical objective is an attack against a
suitable target;
2. the intermediate stage in which the strategic objective is the dissemina-
tion by the media of the ideological claim or the terror-inspiring effect
of the act;
3. the final stage in which the ultimate objective is the achievement of
the desired power outcome.
The strategic objective of the terrorist influences his choice of tactical
targets and means. Ideologically motivated perpetrators are likely to
attack highly visible targets in a dramatic manner in order to attract
media attention and thereby maximize the anticipated media-created
impact of the event. 70 The media thus unwittingly further terrorist
objectives by publicizing an event that has been staged by the perpetra-
tor for the very reason of obtaining media coverage to produce a social
impact which would not otherwise exist.
In addition to seeking maximum exposure, the media-conscious
perpetrator attempts to manipulate the instruments of mass communi-
cation to publicize his ideology in a manner that conveys the desirability
or inevitability of his ultimate objective. Through such manipulation
the terrorist-may seek, for example, to: (1) demonstrate the vulnerabil-
ity and impotence of the government; (2) attract broader public sympa-
thy by the choice of a carefully selected target that may be publicly
rationalized; (3) cause a polarization and radicalization among the pub-
lic; (4) goad the government into repressive action likely to discredit it;
or (5) present the violent acts in a manner that makes them appear he-
roic.
In his Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, Carlos Marighella expounds
the terrorist strategy of media manipulation:
The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressive technique, based
68 Teror Violence, supra note I, at 759.
69 Id. at 760.
70 Id. at 757.
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on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news
transmitted orally in order to demoralize the government. In psychologi-
cal warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage since it imposes
censorship on the mass media and winds up in a defensive position by not
allowing anything against it to filter through. At this point it becomes
desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and
loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is subject to
being broken at any moment.
7 1
It is apparent in this statement that the media are as much victims of
the strategy of terror-violence as is society and its institutions. The Ira-
nian seizure of the United States Embassy demonstrates strikingly how
the media are manipulable for the strategic goal of the perpetrators.
C. THE "CINEMATOGENIC" LINK BETWEEN TERROR-VIOLENCE AND
THE MASS MEDIA
One corollary of the proposed relationship between terrorism and
the media is that state-sponsored as well as non-state-sponsored groups
rely heavily on media-created stereotypes. So close is the interaction
between the media and terror-violence that terrorist groups conform to
certain media stereotypes in their internal organizational structure,
chain of command, and even in the attitudes of their members. Like-
wise, the choice of targets and the time, manner, and place of action
frequently correspond to media-created perceptions of what is expected
in such spectacles. Those stereotypes, here termed the "cinematogenic"
nature of contemporary terroristic behavior, afford support for the the-
ory that a symbiotic relationship exists between the media and terror-
ism. Three consequences of the cinematogenic effect are critical in
shaping terrorist events. First, the perpetrator's patterns of behavior
seek to meet media expectations as portrayed in the context of either
fact or fiction. Second, responding to stereotyped portrayals provides a
framework facilitating communication between perpetrators and media
personnel. Third, conformity to stereotype provides a sound basis for
predictability of behavior and responses on the part of the perpetrators,
the media, and the general public.
D. THE MEDIA-ENHANCED IMPACT OF TERROR-VIOLENCE
Democratic societies guaranteeing freedom of the press confront
four problems associated with media coverage of terror-violence. First,
coverage may encourage, by contagion, imitation, or otherwise, other
individuals to engage in such conduct. Secondly, unbalanced media
coverage enhances the climate of intimidation which the terrorist seeks
to generate. Not only does this aid the perpetrator's objectives, but it
71 C. MARIGHELLA, MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA 103 (no date).
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engenders pressures for counterproductive governmental repression and
causes undesirable social consequences. Thirdly, media coverage may
dull the sense of opprobrium of the general public. Finally, media re-
porting practices may endanger hostages' lives and interfere with effec-
tive law enforcement. 72 These problems, treated in detail below,
generally arise during contemporaneous, on-the-scene coverage of ongo-
ing incidents.
The Contagion Hypothesis
The theory that media attention given terror-violence acts encour-
ages further incidents has been labeled the contagion hypothesis. 73 Al-
though this effect does not appear entirely susceptible to empirical
verification, 74 at least with respect to ideologically motivated individu-
als, it is intuitively reasonable. For example, success may encourage a
terrorist group to repeat attacks in order to maintain public attention.
In addition, publicity generated by one terrorist group, such as that ac-
corded the Italian Red Brigades by virtue of the Aldo Moro kidnapping,
may cause increased or more daring action by other groups.
75
The contagion hypothesis may also apply to perpetrators motivated
72 From a different perspective, however, it should be noted that media coverage and
media portrayal may serve as a safety valve in instances where media coverage is a way of
securing the release of hostages as well as when media coverage co-opts the need for terror-
violence by the dissemination of certain claims which would otherwise become exteriorized
through violent action. See generall R. CRELINSTIN & D. SZABO, HOSTAGE TAKING (1979).
73 See, e.g., DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, supra note 63, at 23-24, 237. "There is consider-
able evidence that contagion and imitation are significant factors in the incidence of terroris-
tic activity. Often, after the use of novel and seemingly successful terroristic techniques has
been widely publicized, they have been imitated and embellished by other terrorists. -Much
quasi-terroristic activity may be explained this way." Id. at 23. See also Hickey, supra note 64;
text accompanying note 74 infra. In a report prepared for the U.S. State Department, the
Rand Corporation stated: "It is hard not to conclude that terrorism judged on its own
terms--as a way to get attention and arouse alarm-has been a success, and that highly
visible success is likely to lead to further incidents of terrorism." Hickey, supra note 60.
74 Nevertheless, commentators have repeatedly expressed concern over this effect. See
Mendelsohn, Socio-Psychological Perspectives on the Mass Media and Public Anxiety, JOURNALISM
Q., 1963, at 513. Individuals unable to redress a particular grievance, but otherwise normal,
may also resort to terroristic means. After the Hanafi incident, Dr. Robert Jay Lifton, profes-
sor of psychiatry at Yale, remarked that when the press makes "the person of the terrorist
something close to the total news of the week, the imagery of terrorism becomes much more
active psychologically for the average person. Therefore it must contribute to stimulating
similar acts among people who feel frustrated and for whom other avenues are closed." N.Y.
Times, March 19, 1977, at 33, col. 2.
75 For an enumeration of incidents, see R. LIEBERTi J. NEALE & E. DAVIDSON, THE
EARLY WINDOW 1-3 (1973). See generally Hendrick, When Teevirion Is a Schoolfor Criminals, TV
GUIDE, Jan. 29, 1977, at 4. After interviewing inmates at a Michigan prison, Hendrick re-
ports that 90% admitted that they had "learned new tricks and improved their criminal ex-
pertise by watching crime programs," while 40% said they had attempted the televised crimes
they had viewed. Id. at 5. The 1978 CIA Report on terrorism predicts that "West German
terrorists, having suffered reverses during the past year, are likely to feel greater pressure to
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by non-ideological reasons. Since the mass media have the ability to
"confer status upon an individual or an event merely by presenting
them, ' 76 the spotlight of media attention may be an irresistible lure to
violence for certain psychopathic individuals. The common criminal,
motivated by personal gain, may imitate successful techniques made
known to him by media coverage of prior terrorist incidents.
77
Researchers continue to focus on the contagion hypothesis, but
have not uncovered conclusive data. Common sense suggests a rule of
imitation, implied in the theory of contagion, particularly when the imi-
tation carries the promise of reward. Noteworthy also is the Sommer
study, which indicates that 93% of the police chiefs surveyed "believed
live television coverage of terrorist's acts encouraged terrorism. ' 78 No
research presently corroborates that belief, but the question remains
that if law enforcement officials harbor such a belief, perpetrators of
violence may harbor it as well.
The counter-effect of contagion is deterrence produced by publi-
cized failure of terrorist acts due to effective law enforcement. The me-
remind their domestic and international sympathizers that they remain revolutionary leaders
by engaging in operations at home or overseas." CIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
76 Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence.- First Amendment Principls and Social Science The-
o9,, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1134 (1978).
77 In 1971, D.B. Cooper skyjacked an airplane, collected a ransom, and successfully es-
caped by parachute. This technique was widely imitated. DISORDERS AND TERRORISM,
supra note 63, at 23. Although many examples have been recorded of criminal education
through media presentation of crime, one incident stands out:
Of Rod Serling's programs, "Doomsday Flight" probably is the most memorable. A
caller hides an altitude bomb aboard an airliner and demands a ransom. If the company
refuses to pay, he will not divulge the location of the bomb, and the plane will be de-
stroyed as it descends for a landing. In the end, the pilot saves the plane by selecting an
airport located at an elevation above the critical altitude. "Doomsday Flight" gained
notoriety because of the immediate reaction it created. Before the hour-long program
was over, one airline received an identical bomb threat; four similar threats came during
the next twenty-four hours and another eight during the following week. Exported to
other countries, the show made one Australian criminal $500,000.00 richer thanks to
Quantas Airlines' desire to protect 116 passengers en route to Hong Kong, while BOAC
officials faced with a similar threat demonstrated familiarity with the script by arranging
a landing at Denver instead of London.
Terror Violence, supra note 1, at 759-60.
Although Doomsday Flight was fictional, instruction in criminal techniques may also re-
sult from regular news reporting. For example, after media reporting of a skyjacking in which
the perpetrator successfully escaped by parachute, subsequent skyjackers routinely included a
parachute as an item in their demands. Seegenerally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); W. RIVERS, T. PETERSON & J. JENSEN, THE MASS MEDIA AND
MODERN SOCIETY 28-29 (2d ed. 1971); W. SCHRAMM, MASS COMMUNICATIONS (2d ed.
1960); Mendelsohn, supra note 74, at 511-12; Wright, Functional Analysis and Mass Communica-
tions, 24 PUB. OPINION Q. 605 (1960). The same contagion impact through education and
emulation can also affect psychopathological individuals as Dr. David Hubbard reported in
his well-known study. See D. HUBBARD, supra note 17.
78 M. Sommer, Project on Television Coverage of Terrorism, refportedin EDITOR AND PUB-
LISHER, Aug. 27, 1977, at 12.
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dia also produce an effect known as the cathartic effect. That theory
holds that media coverage of an event or social grievance can weaken
the motivation of other individuals to engage in terror-violence in order
to attract attention to the social problem at issue. However, as is the
case with the contagion effect, research on the cathartic effect is incon-
clusive. The existence of the latter phenomenon does not necessarily
imply the nonexistence of the contagion effect because of the widely dif-
ferent circumstances triggering these effects. For the purposes of the
present analysis, it is presumed that media coverage has contagious con-
sequences.
The Climate of Intimidation and the Pjychological'y Projected Prediction
Perhaps the most pervasive problem associated with media report-
ing of terror-violence is the climate of intimidation it engenders, a gen-
eral fear of victimization that both despoils the quality of life and
destabilizes social institutions. Although intimidation is usually a strate-
gic objective of terror-violence, isolated incidents could not produce the
ubiquitous psychological impact achieved through the repetitive dissem-
ination of the terror-inspiring act.
In its social role, the media act in part as mediators between man
and the environment. As society increases in complexity and events af-
fecting individual welfare occur increasingly outside one's immediate
experience, man's reliance on the mass media correspondingly increases
as he attempts to construct for himself a trustworthy picture of his envi-
ronment. 79 By providing information from the outside world, the media
influence the way people view the world and, consequently, their behav-
ior. The classic example of media influence on public emotions is the
1938 radio broadcast of H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds.80 As Professor
Harold Mendelsohn has written, "the mere fact that the so-called inva-
sion was presented in the form of a radio broadcast gave it an authentic-
ity per se which was sufficient for many listeners to accept uncritically
and to base behavioral action upon."8' Similarly, a degree of public
anxiety is a necessary by-product of media reporting of news events dur-
ing times of stress.82 Such media-created anxiety, Mendelsohn contin-
ues, is "functional rather than dysfunctional" only when it prepares
individuals to confront danger realistically:
It is where the mass media offer false standards of judgment by which
readers, listeners and viewers may misinterpret the news that the dangers
79 See W. LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922).
80 For a study of the public reaction to the broadcast, see Cantril, The Invasion fom Mars,
in W. SCHRAMM, THE PROCESSES AND EFFEaTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 423 (1954).
81 Mendelsohn, supra note 74, at 513.
82 Id. at 513-14.
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lie. Whether through ignorance, guile, vested interest or irresponsibility-
where some sectors of the mass media create dysfunctional anxiety, we
have a serious problem on our hands.
83
The potential outcome of this public anxiety is to enhance the per-
ceived power of the terrorist in his own eyes, as well as in the eyes of his
peer group and other groups and individuals. Such enhanced perceived
power, combined with an awareness of socially vulnerable targets and
ineffective law enforcement, produces public intimidation.
With recurrence of incidents producing a psychological projection
prediction syndrome, the impact increases. This syndrome is a psycho-
logical reaction by which prior knowledge is recalled as a result of new
information and then a projected prediction of harmful effect is made.
The effect of psychological prediction seems to be a function of the fre-
quency of reporting information on such incidents which makes the fact
more readily available to human consciousness, irrespective of specifics
such as actual harm. Thus repetition of a key word in the print or elec-
tronic media, after its repeated usage, may cause the public to make a
prediction about the event it describes in a particular instance without
regard to the actual facts of that case. This syndrome may enhance not
only the climate of intimidation, but, indirectly, all violence.
The climate of intimidation may lead ultimately to either a level of
tolerance (the immunization effect discussed below) or, conversely, the
heightened resistance needed to combat terror-violence. The only ca-
veat to the above conclusion is that it may cause counterproductive
overreaction.
The Immunization Efct
The immunization effect is manifested in three ways. The first, an
increased level of public tolerance of violence and terror-violence, de-
rives from continuous media coverage of both. This tolerance magnifies
when, in addition, such coverage is associated with certain "rewards"
such as social prominence, sex appeal, financial success, or political im-
portance. This increased acceptance of violence in turn increases its
contagion effect. The second immunization effect derives from the por-
trayal of terrorists as crazies, or as individuals and organizations beyond
the social means of control. In short, society explains away the phenom-
enon by considering it to be alien.
The third effect derives from the conceptualization of the act of
terror-violence and its harmful effect. That effect is best describeable by
reference to the Iranian hostage crisis of November, 1979. The media
seldom referred to the hostages as individuals with names, families, and
83 Id. at 514.
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lives. The word "hostages" acquired the connotation of pawns on the
chessboard of world politics. Thus, the public directed its outrage more
at the political significance of the acts than its human dimensions.
The immunization effect, in any of its three modes, may increase
violence for two reasons. First, the level of violence increases to over-
come the dulled perceptions of the public in order to elicit the terror-
inspiring effect desired. Second, more persons may resort to violence as
a result of lessening social opprobrium. Public immunization and a con-
comitant increase in violence is not, however, a necessary consequence of
media coverage of terror-violence. In fact, the opposite is likely where
media portrayal increases public opposition and reaction to such behav-
ior, and galvanizes social values. For example, the media might deem-
phasize terrorists and facilitate the public's ability to react to hostages as
individuals by presenting the public with the hostages' backgrounds, in-
terests, beliefs, and appearances. Thus terrorists must strike a careful
balance between sufficient balanced media coverage to produce immu-
nization, without inducing media outrage which could trigger opposing
social reaction. In this respect the media and the public must clarify the
values embodied in the media's function in society.
The Combined E.fect of Contagion, Intimidation, and Immuniration
and Media Coverage Impact
To the extent the media abuse-or allow the terrorist to abuse-
their social mediating role, the media represent the terrorist's powers
disproportionately to his actual capacity to harm. This abuse enhances
the climate of intimidation while stimulating emulation through conta-
gion. Although the media are becoming more accurate, responsible,
and self-critical than in their often sensationalist past,8 4 reporting abuses
are still prevalent.
The portrayal of violence in literature and the mass media has been
a cause for concern for over one hundred years.8 5 The popularity and
pervasiveness of television and the movie industry in shaping the atti-
tudes of its audience has made that medium the subject of recent scru-
tiny by individuals, citizens groups,86 and the Congress.87 Some
84 See Gruenwald, The Press, the Courts and the Counti, TIME, July 16, 1979, at 74. For an
account of press sensationalism, notably that of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulit-
zer, see J. TEBBEL, THE MEDIA IN AMERICA 279-303 (1974).
85 SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION I (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter cited as VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION].
86 In addition to various church groups and the National Parent-Teachers Association,
the American Medical Association adopted a resolution in 1976 that "TV violence is a risk
factor threatening the health and welfare of young Americans, indeed our future society."
AMA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 280 (June 1976) (Res. No. 38). The
1981]
M. CHERIF BASSIO UNI
researchers, notably Dr. George Gerbner, have concluded that heavy
viewers of televised violence are far more likely to view the world with
alienation, distrust, and fear.8 Others, including the Surgeon General
of the United States, have reported that viewing of televised violence by
children encourages antisocial tendencies and aggressive behavior.8 9 Al-
though the causal connection between the level of violence on television
and its psychological and behavioral impact upon viewers has not been
satisfactorily established,9° the Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce nevertheless concluded that "an excessive amount of tele-
vised violence is a source of sufficient societal concern to warrant con-
gressional attention and scrutiny." 91 In a vigorous dissent, six members
of the fifteen-member subcommittee went even farther, and concluded
that the available evidence unmistakably established the adverse effects
of viewing televised violence and that affirmative steps to reduce its
presentation should be taken.
92
resolution encouraged all physicians to oppose TV programs containing violence as well as
products and services sponsoring the programs. See Sex and Violence on TV- Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings].
87 Prior to 1976, Senate investigations were conducted into the relationship between the
media and the rising crime rate. SeeJuvenile Delin queng (Eects on Young People of Violence and
Crime Portrayed on Television): Hearings Before the Subcomn to Investigate Juvenile Delinquen of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciagi, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (pt. 16) (1965);Juvenile Delinquency (Television
Programs): Hearings Before the Subcomm. to InvestigateJuvenile Delinqueny of the Senate Comm on the
Judiciacy, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1954-55); Violence on Television: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
88 See G. GERBNER, L. GROSS, M. ELEEY, M. JACKSoN-BEECK, S. JEFFRIES-Fox & N.
SIGNORIELLI, VIOLENCE PROFILE No. 7: TRENDS IN NETWORK TELEVISION DRAMA AND
VIEWER CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL REALITY 1967-75 9 (1975). Dr. Gerbner has monitored
television violence since 1968. See generally Gerbner & Gross, Living with Television The Violence
Profile, 26 J. COM. 172 (1976). For a critique of Gerbner's methodology and conclusions, see
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 76, at 1157-70.
89 See SURGEON GEN.'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BE-
HAVIOR, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE (1972).
The Surgeon General subsequently testified that
broadcasters should be put on notice. The overwhelming consensus and unanimous...
report indicates that televised violence, indeed, does have an adverse effect on certain
members of our society. . . . [I]t is clear to me that the causal relationship between
televised violence and anti-social behavior is sufficient to warrant appropriate and imme-
diate remedial action. The data on social phenomena such as television and violence
and/or aggressive behavior will never be clear enough for all social scientists. . . . But
there comes a time when data are sufficient to justify action. That time has come.
Surgeon General's Report to the Scientif Advisory Comm. on Television and Social Behavior: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 25,
26 (1972) (statement of Dr. Jesse Steinfield, Surgeon General). On the relationship between
televised violence and aggression, see also A. BANDURA, AGGRESSION (1973).
90 See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 76, at 1134-70; 1976 House Hearings, supra
note 86, at 10-20. But see note 89 supra.
91 VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION, supra note 85, at 7.
92 Id. at 17-19 (dissenting views of Reps. Waxman, Wirth, Mikulski, Markey & Gore).
The minority stated that the FCC should initiate rulemaking proceedings on whether licen-
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In addition to serving an important public function, the media also
are private business enterprises in pursuit of a profit. Although bigness
and the profit motive may have some positive effect on the quantity and
quality of news reporting and media independence, 93 commercial fac-
tors also may lead to abuses. Since profits are obtained from selling time
or space to advertisers at rates determined by circulation or audience
size, the media in a sense are engaged in the business of selling attention.
When news reporting becomes a commercial product whose relative me-
dia emphasis is determined by its potential for sensationalism, excessive
coverage may afford violent events a disproportionate significance. The
line between informing and entertaining in news reporting has always
been indefinite, but the consequence of presenting acts of terror-violence
as mass entertainment 94 is to augment dangerously the terrorist's audi-
ence.
The competitiveness of news organizations, their fear of being
scooped by the opposition, and their quest for larger audiences and pres-
tige encourages escalation in reporting techniques. Reporters do not
simply report the news; they are often subjective participants-actors,
scriptwriters, and idea men.95 They seek to establish a personal reputa-
tion and to advance careers. Terrorists are aware of those desires and
often seek to exploit them. While direct media contact and interviews
with a terrorist make for a more exciting story, such reporting tech-
niques may afford the perpetrator an unedited platform and excessive
publicity. Hand-held microwave minicams enable terrorist incidents to
be broadcast live into the viewer's home, where television's visual im-
pact, immediacy, and realism may foster a climate of intimidation. In
short, when commercial and competitive factors displace judgment in
the coverage of terrorist incidents, the media may lose control over the
situation, and itself become hostage to the terrorist.
96
sees should be required to "carry certain percentages of certain categories of programming."
Id. at 24.
93 Se Grunwald, supra note 84, at 75.
94 For the proposition that coverage of terrorist incidents have become a form of en-
tertainment, see DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, supra note 63, at 8; Arlen, ROcaionr on Terror-
ism and the Media, MORE, June, 1977, at 12. A further problem may arise when spectacular
and often tragic events are dramatized by the media for entertainment purposes, although it
seems that the "networks have developed certain sensibilities and systems to counterbalance
those inevitable competitive urges" and "are genuinely edgy about the risks of developing
highly exploitable topics." Bedell, Is TVExploiting Tragedy?, TV GUIDE, June 16, 1979, at 8.
95 THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM, supra note 36, at 29 (remarks of Fenyvesi).
96 Such an instance occurred in Indianapolis in February, 1977. Anthony Kiritsis kid-
napped mortgage company executive Richard Hall and held him captive in an apartment
believed booby-trapped with explosives. The 62-hour siege was covered by an army of na-
tional and regional reporters, and live television transmitters were ready for any break in the
story. Trounstine, We Interrupt This t'ogram, MORE, June, 1977, at 14. Kiritsis demanded live
coverage of a statement to the press as a condition of his surrender. The media readily ac-
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The experience with the Iranian crisis illustrates this phenomenon.
The primary objective of the terrorists was to obtain media coverage.
97
The saturation coverage rewarded the perpetrators while at the same
time triggering other violent reactions elsewhere. During that period of
time United States embassies were attacked in Bangladesh, Libya, and
Pakistan. The intimidation effect was also obvious as the United States
feared to engage in action likely to affect the life and well-being of the
hostages, a sign of the partial success of the action (and the apparent
objective of the perpetrators) gained only through media coverage.
During this crisis the media faced anew the problem of how much
to allow themselves to be instrumentalized in order to satisfy their insti-
tutional and competitive needs. In the interview with Marine Corporal
William Gallegos, under a portrait of Khomeini, Gallegos spoke of the
absence of ill treatment of the hostages. Alongside him was one of the
perpetrators who delivered an unedited six-minute propaganda speech.
The entire broadcast lasted thirty minutes, and was fully aired on prime
time by NBC with excerpts on the evening news. NBC was strongly
criticized by the media for relinquishing its responsibilities by permit-
ting mass dissemination of the perpetrators' message of terror-violence. 98
Apparently exhibiting the contagion effect, the hostage-takers offered
NBC another film on December 26, 1979, of clergymen visiting the hos-
tages at Christmas, but NBC rejected it.99 Potential terrorists, inspired
by the impact of the Gallegos interview, are likely to seek direct and
ceded in order to save Hall's life and to better cover the dramatic incident. But instead of
surrendering, Kiritsis emerged with a shotgun wired to his captive's neck and proceeded to
deliver a diatribe riddled with obscenities. Id. at 15. One station interrupted the live cover-
age after about ten minutes, fearful that thousands of viewers might, at any moment, witness
a live execution with color cameras at close range. Id. "We had a man here who was holding
live television hostage as well as he was holding Mr. Hall hostage," an executive of the televi-
sion station explained. "He was controlling us, manipulating us, and we didn't want to be a
party to that. We elected to reassert control of the airwaves." Id. Two local stations, how-
ever, continued to broadcast the entire ordeal, with one news director later conceding, "We
should have controlled it more than we did. The event controlled us." Id.
97 Tehran's Reluctant Diplomats, TIME, Dec. 4, 1979, at 64. Speaking to some 200 journalists
assembled by the Ministry of National Guidance, Iranian Acting Foreign Minister Abol Has-
san Banisadr said, "Diplomats cannot solve this problem. We want to solve it through 'news-
paper diplomacy.' " The contents of this article go on to describe what it refers to as "The
most blatant use of television diplomacy" wherein its users were "playing the ratings game."
The substance of the article indicates how much the Iranians "managed" the news and relied
on the fact that the crisis, which they created, was exploiting the media for what was obvi-
ously a political goal. Id. Clearly the hostage-taking, at times described as a non-govern-
ment-sponsored act, had a power-outcome goal which relied substantially on its media-
created impact. See also Bassiouni, Let the World Know How We Will React Next Time, Chicago
Sun-Times, Jan. 28, 1981, at 42, col. 1; Sun- Times Editorial, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 28, 1981,
at 43, col. 1; TIME, Dec. 17, 1979, at 106.
98 See Gruenwald, supra note 84, at 74-75; Telling the News vs. Zapping the Cornea, TIME,
Oct. 1, 1979, at 83.
99 See Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 27, 1979, at 2.
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unedited access to the public via the electronic media.100 Balanced cov-
erage of trends in violence and law enforcement policies and capabilities
is essential to adequately and accurately warn and inform the public of
the danger posed by terrorism. Follow-up coverage of an incident is
essential to aid public understanding, to combat irrational fears aroused
by the event, and to prepare the public to react to future incidents. 10
Coverage of the law enforcement and judicial responses also may help
deter future perpetrators. 10 2 Unfortunately, some media, particularly
the electronic media, may be capable of carrying only the most current
stories. As a result, presentation lacks proper balance.
03
Terrorists have a special affinity for gaining access to television,
"for they appreciate its potency, its immediacy and its vast potential
audience."' 1 4 Operating clandestinely, 10 5 terrorist groups can deter-
mine when, and even to some degree how, the media cover them, and
thus can manipulate the image transmitted. But, as has been observed,
"[t]here is virtually no limitation upon the television reporting of abuses,
100 One cannot help but conclude these observations without reference to the other signifi-
cant incident of terror-violence which took place during that same period, namely the seizure
of the Grand Mosque of Mecca along with hundreds of hostages held in it, in November,
1979. That incident was of much greater significance for the Islamic world than the seizure of
the U.S. Embassy and 63 U.S. diplomats. The Saudi-Arabian government's first action was
to seal off the area to the media. The result was limited coverage of the incident, with few
specific details as it was unfolding. The perpetrators had no access to the media, which was
therefore unable to disseminate their terror-inspiring message. The incident lasted over a
week of prolonged and intense fighting. One-hundred-fifty-six persons were killed, and much
damage was done to that holy shrine. With the reduction of contemporaneous coverage,
however, there was no intimidation or contagion, and law enforcement agents controlled the
crisis without further danger to society. One cannot help but speculate as to the outcome of
the Iranian hostage-taking had the media given only limited factual coverage to the incident.
[The summary of events above was drawn by the author from a number of news and informa-
tion sources.-Ed.]
101 DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, sufira note 63, at 402-03.
102 Id. at 368-69, 402-03.
103 TELEVISION AND CONFLICT, supra note 64. The special relationship of television to
terrorism was the subject of a recent British conference under the auspices of the Institute for
the Study of Conflict. In its special report, the unique role of television was noted.
Television in the mass media form has acquired over the last 20 odd years an infinitely
more powerful and penetrating means of communication than anything hitherto known
to us. If a person reads a newspaper or a book, only the sense of sight is being employed
and his reactions are entirely self-induced. Radio employs the sense of hearing and reac-
tions to what is said are already to a very large extent affected by the manner of presen-
tation. With television not only are the senses of sight and hearing fully occupied, but
every emotion is closely caught and involved in what is happening on the live screen in
the opposite corner of 15 million living rooms. This is a captive audience not necessarily
in possession of the independent criteria by which to form judgments.
Id. at 14.
104 Id. at 15 (quoting P. WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 169-70
(1979)).
105 Id. at 26.
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real or alleged, in pluralist and representative societies." 10 6 Thus "tele-
vision seems inevitably one-sided, and its bias inevitably on the side of
the revolutionaries and against established authority. ' 10 7 Some have
suggested that in a state of undeclared war waged by terrorists against
an open and democratic society, the powerful weapon of the media
should be employed in defense of society and denied to the terrorist.'08
Because of television's power and impact, because of the lack of choice
afforded its viewers compared to that afforded recipients of the print
media, 10 9 and because of its operation by government authority, televi-
sion may have "a special duty to uphold, or at any rate not to under-
mine, constitutional authority and the forces of law and order." 110
E. PROBLEMS OF COVERING ONGOING ATTACKS AND RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
While the preceding sections dealt -with certain general aspects of
motivation and the impact of media coverage on both perpetrators and
the public, this section focuses on the more specific problem of ongoing
attacks. The reason for focusing on this area is that it has been per-
ceived as susceptible to concrete solutions.
Extensive coverage of ongoing terrorist attacks provides the oppor-
tunity for terrorists to obtain publicity for their cause and rivet society's
attention to their exercise of power in open defiance of the government
and law. Ongoing terrorist attacks are also the occasion of greatest con-
flict between the interests of law enforcement authorities and those of
the media. The media perform several important functions, among
which is controlling rumors by disseminating accurate information to
the public of dangers present at the site. While the importance of the
media in this capacity cannot be ignored, experience has shown that
contemporaneous coverage of a terrorist attack consistently gives rise to
three general areas of conflict between police and media.
The first area of conflict includes media dissemination of informa-
tion tactically useful to the terrorist. For example, terrorists have
equipped themselves with radio and television receivers which allow
them to listen to news broadcasts when barricaded with hostages within
a building. Thus the media may serve as the intelligence arm of the
terrorist when it broadcasts the latest operational activities of the police,
the presence of hidden persons who could become hostages, escaping
hostages, the bargaining strategy of police negotiators, or any deceptions
106 Id. at 5.
107 Id. at 4.
108 Id. at 11-12, 21-22.
109 Id. at 14.
110 Id.
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planned by law enforcement officials."1' Not only is the dissemination
of such information critically helpful to the terrorist in determining pos-
sible escape routes or repelling impending police assaults, but it jeopar-
dizes the lives of hostages, law enforcement personnel, and innocent
citizens. During the October, 1977, hijacking of a Lufthansa jet, the
media directly contributed to the death of a hostage when they broad-
cast that the pilot was passing intelligence information to the police
through his normal radio transmissions. The terrorists had access to the
radio news reports and executed the captain."
2
In March, 1977, Hamaas Abdul Khaalis, a zealot bent upon aveng-
ing the murder of his children by Black Muslims, led the takeover of
three Washington, D.C., buildings by the small Hanafi Muslim sect. A
local television reporter outside the besieged B'nai B'rith building filmed
a basket being lifted by rope to the fifth floor, where eleven people had
evaded capture and had barricaded themselves in a room. Although
apparently initially ignorant of their presence, fellow Hanafis monitor-
ing the news reports outside probably informed the gunmen of the tele-
vision reporter's scoop."13 Fortunately, the gunmen did not break
through the door, and police later freed the potential hostages after a
tense, nine-hour ordeal."t 4 Similar problems may arise in the context of
newspaper reporting. Since some incidents may last for many hours,
even days, newspaper accounts can also communicate tactical informa-
tion to the perpetrators. The release of such information only endangers
more lives and contributes little, if anything, to the public interest. It is
not unreasonable, therefore, that in the absence of self-control, the me-
dia should be compelled to refrain from publishing information poten-
tially helpful to the terrorists until the police are able to free the hostages
from danger.
A second area of conflict is media interference with an effective law
enforcement response. Direct media contact with a perpetrator while an
attack is underway can interfere with law enforcement response in a
number of ways: 15 (1) tying up telephone lines; (2) goading the terror-
ist into action to prove himself under the spotlight of attention; (3) incit-
ing the terrorist by the use of certain inflammatory questions or
phrases; 116 (4) isolating trained professional negotiators from the medi-
111 Terror Violence, sufra note 1, at 761.
112 Alexander, supra note 64, at 107.
113 THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM, sutira note 36, at 28-29.
114 Id.
115 Terror Vi0olene, .upira note 1, at n.31.
116 Many perpetrators may react violently to a particular question or term that does not
comport with their ideological or psychological makeup:
Terrorists can behave like utterly normal men most of the time, perfectly balanced and
intelligent, often with a far higher than average IQ. Yet in the commission of their
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ating process by increasing the role of untrained media personnel; 117
and (5) aggravating the often precarious psychological balance in which
the terrorists operate by upsetting them, giving them the comfort of
company, or interrupting the pattern of negotiations the police have at-
tempted to establish."1 8
The Hanafi incident provides a powerful example of the adverse
effects of direct communication by media personnel. Telephone calls by
the media to the gunmen were so numerous that police negotiators had
difficulty contacting the perpetrators. A local radio broadcaster asked
Khaalis during a live telephone interview whether he had set a deadline,
although the police and other experts had thought the absence of a
deadline was encouraging. 19 Another media contact enraged Khaalis
by identifying his sect with the Black Muslims although in fact the
Hanafis had broken off from the Muslims. Khaalis threatened to exe-
cute one hostage in retaliation for the reporter's remark and was molli-
fied only after the newsman, following police advice, apologized for his
unfortunate choice of words.
120
The third area of conflict arising between media and law enforce-
ment interests involves crowd control. Reporters with obtrusive equip-
ment may physically interfere with the free movement of law
enforcement personnel and may attract crowds that compound the risks
and burdens to the police. Questioning by a multitude of reporters may
distract decisionmakers at a critical moment. Also, the obvious presence
of many media representatives, especially those in television with lights
and cameras, may encourage the terrorist either to remain barricaded to
increase coverage, or to demand a press conference to gain direct per-
sonal or political publicity. The presence of the media thus may trans-
form a news event into a spectacle attracting even greater numbers of
crimes they become completely abnormal. Those who have had experience of conversa-
tion with them can discover that one particular word, a trigger word, perhaps the name
of a President or the object of the terrorists' hatred, can turn a seemingly normal man
into an irrational and abnormal one in front of your eyes.
TELEVISION AND CONFLICT, sufira note 64, at 19-20.
117 One media representative even advised gunmen not to give up their hostages so as to
retain their bargaining position with the police. Crii Cop Raps Media, MORE, June, 1977, at
19 (interview with Lt. Frank Bolz, head of N.Y.C.P.D.'s Hostage Negotiating Squad).
118 Additionally, not only does publicity hinder negotiation by subjecting the police to the
additional pressure of public criticism, but the media indiscriminately publicize events even
though publicity could itself serve as a valuable negotiating tool.
119 THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM, supra note 36, at 29 (remarks of Fenyvesi).
120 Id See also Fenyvesi, Looking Into the Marzle of Terrorists, QUILL, July-Aug., 1977, at 17.
For another account by a journalist held captive by the Hanafis critical of the media's inter-
ference with police management and hostage safety during the incident, see Siegel, Looking at
the Media from the Other End of the Gun, in MEDIA AND TERRORISM: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
IMPACT 41 (1978) (seminar sponsored by Growth Associates).
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people and thereby increasing the volatility of the situation. 121 A possi-
ble solution to the problems presented by on-the-scene reporting is cur-
tailment of coverage of terror-violence events. The risk to the public of
such a solution is a weakening of its ability to monitor law enforcement
conduct. 1
22
Contemporaneous media coverage provides, however, two specific
and positive advantages to law enforcement agents. First, media cover-
age is frequently the most effective bargaining tool that a negotiator has
in dealing with terrorists. Second, media coverage can provide law en-
forcement with otherwise unavailable tactical and intelligence informa-
tion. In the Iranian hostage-taking, for example, the only source of
information was media coverage. 123 Thus the problems created by me-
dia coverage can be offset by the directly related benefits it provides, in
addition to other benefits to society which derive from the media's infor-
mational and watchdog roles.
F. CONCLUSION
The media's pervasive influence is well established. Their privi-
leged role in society derives in large measure from fundamental demo-
cratic values which imply a high level of responsibility. Assuring
responsibility in reporting in order to preserve these values is a task best
administered by the media themselves.
The importance of law enforcement in preserving order and pro-
tecting citizens and property is similarly beyond dispute. Yet it is ill-
equipped to deal with the improbable and unusual character of terror-
ism. Its legitimate apprehension of such incidents and the knowledge
that the margin of flexibility for counteraction is limited make it intoler-
ant of the media's purportedly disinterested appraisal and criticism.
That feeling is heightened when the media's coverage tends to enhance
terror-violence in any one of the effects discussed above. The result is
increased animosity between media and law enforcement personnel
which when exacerbated inures only to the benefit of terrorists. As the
cycle of distrust and animosity between media and law enforcement per-
sonnel continues, the potential for cooperation between these institu-
121 According to the 1977 Sommer survey, 93% of the police chiefs responding believed live
television coverage of terrorist acts encourages terrorism and 46% considered live television
coverage to be "a great threat" to hostage safety, while 33% deemed it "a moderate threat."
None believed that terrorist acts should be televised live. M. Sommer, supra note 78, at 12.
122 There are situations of on-the-scene coverage that do not involve law enforcement. For
example, the media covering the Iranian hostage crisis did not have to deal with any law
enforcement agents, only the perpetrators of the seizure and other sources of information. .ee
notes 97-100 & accompanying text supra.
123 This fact may partially explain the expulsion of United States news reporters in Janu-
ary, 1980.
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tions decreases, and the extent of their respective public services is
reduced to the detriment of society. It is essential, therefore, to improve
understanding of the problems discussed herein for the purpose of
achieving increased cooperation between these institutions.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. DEFINING THE ISSUES
Media-enhanced perception of danger to our system and to individ-
ual security may cause the community to overreact. 124 In traumatic
times repressive governmental measures are not unusual. Such restric-
tive laws are likely also to apply to the press.' 25 For example, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, a country that has recently been the scene of
terror-violence activity, has recently enacted legislation attaching crimi-
nal sanctions to media glorification of terrorist violence.126 Commenta-
tors in the United Kingdom have expressed the need for additional
legislation making it "a criminal offense for broadcasting organisations
to transmit material which encourages or is likely to encourage terrorism
or violence for political ends."' 27 In the United States, however, the
question arises whether government, in response to public pressure,
124 For an analysis of the pressures and influences to which the media are subject, see text
accompanying notes 85-110 supra. Media coverage may help to fulfill the following strategic
objectives of terrorists:
1) publicizing the claims of the perpetrators;
2) disseminating specific information about the perpetrators' ideology;
3) destroying or reducing confidence in the government or specific public authorities;
4) extracting certain specific concessions;
5) creating a general climate of public vulnerability;
6) stimulating a feeling of general apprehension coupled with the feeling of ineffective
police protection;
7) projecting the perpetrators in a hero-like image;
8) projecting the government, public authorities or specific decision-makers in nega-
tive images;
9) conveying the general impression that the perpetrators or their followers can act at
will;
10) providing a basis for the public's justification or rationalization of the act;
11) compelling the government or law enforcement authorities to engage in conduct or
take measures which would be inimical to public sentiment;
12) placing the government or public authorities in dilemmas which highlight their
weaknesses, indecision, or tendency to act contrary to the laws or public sentiment;
13) securing sympathy or new adherants to the movement, ideology in question or sup-
port for a specific claim.
Terror Violence, supra note 1, at 762.
After the Hanafi incident, Ronald Reagan called on broadcasting news directors to stop
all live coverage of terrorist events and Andrew Young stated that "The First Amendment has
got to be clarified by the Supreme Court in the light of the power of the mass media." N.Y.
Times, March 19, 1977, at 33, col. 1. Former President Ford has called for an end to terror-
ism and attendant "lavish media attention." N.Y. Times, June 10, 1977, at 15, col. 6.
125 See 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 446, 451 (1975) (Media Law Conference).
126 STGB § 131.
127 TELEVISION AND CONFLiCr, supra note 64, at 35. At the ISC Conference, upon submit-
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could implement restrictions on the media consistent with the first
amendment. 128 Restraint of media coverage of terror-violence incidents
is currently foreseeable only in the context of reporting ongoing events.
It will be further argued that restrictions on the media's ability to di-
vulge information concerning strategic targets of high vulnerability are
reasonable until such time as law enforcement officials are given notice
and have an opportunity to remedy the problem. The inconclusiveness
of research on the various psychological effects on the public of terror-
violence at this point appears to preclude any state regulation of subse-
quent coverage. In this context, it will be suggested that media self-
regulation in the form of general guidelines or licensing procedure is
most appropriate.
Possible media regulatory schemes could take a variety of forms:
(1) government-imposed prior restraints upon media reporting of terror-
ism, (2) content regulation in the form of criminal or civil sanctions at-
taching subsequent punishment to media dissemination of information
having a harmful effect, (3) time, place, and manner regulations,
29
(4) access restrictions curtailing the media's access to ongoing terrorist
attacks, and (5) self-restraint voluntarily adopted by the media. This
last alternative would be more likely than the others to avoid constitu-
tional objections and potentially restrictive first amendment "clarifica-
tion,"' 30 and would furnish a basis for cooperation instead of
confrontation in media-law enforcement relations. In the final analysis,
media self-regulation affords the best opportunity to successfully frus-
trate the publicity objective of terroristic crime' 31 while safeguarding
the public function of the media.
Before commencing the present analysis, three initial observations
regarding the first amendment should be made. First, despite the seem-
ingly categorical command of the first amendment, 32 a majority of the
Supreme Court has never adhered to an absolutist approach in its inter-
pretation. 33 The Court has deemed entire areas of expression outside
ting the question of whether new legislation was needed, 15 participants voted in favor and 15
against, with four abstentions. Id. at 38.
128 The Hutchins Commission wrote in 1947 that "[t]he primary protector of freedom of
expression is government, but any power capable of protecting freedom is also capable of
endangering it." Quoted with approval in 29 U. MIAMI L. REv., supra note 125, at 451.
129 St Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
130 See note 124 supra.
131 DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, sura note 63, at 185-86.
132 "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... " U.S. CoNsT. amend I. Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697 (1931), made the first
amendment applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
133 See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 761 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
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the scope of constitutional protection. 3 4 Even within the ambit of pro-
tected speech, the Court has recognized exceptions. 35 Secondly, the
framers of the amendment could not foresee the rise of the electronic
media 136 in this century to a position of dominance over the other me-
dia. Consequently, their intentions may no longer be as relevant. Fi-
nally, although the first amendment omits "any mention of the fact that
the press was to be responsible as well as free,"' 137 the concept of media
responsibility continues to develop as the theoretical foundation of a free
press shifts from the individual to society. 138 Today publishers and
broadcasters speak less of their individual right to disseminate than of
the "public's right to know."' 139 Under the influence of the Commission
on Freedom of the Press, 14° Professor Barron, 14 1 the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 142 and others, a new theory linking freedom with
responsibility for its exercise may be emerging. The Report of the Task
Force on Disorders and Terrorism echoes this new standard:
A heavy and difficult responsibility rests with those who, in our society,
enjoy freedom of expression, for by its incautious or unintelligent exercise
they may well be contributing to its eventual demise at the hands of un-
principled extremists. The representatives of the media must make an ur-
gent, searching reappraisal of their own values and responsibilities. Only
by facing realistically the choices of potential harm, both to principles and
dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (construing development of the preferred position notion
in prior caselaw).
134 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court established that cer-
tain areas of expression fall outside constitutional protection:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting of "fight-
ing" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
Id. at 571-72. Subsequently, the areas of unprotected expression have been further limited.
See, e.g., Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (limited protection afforded commercial speech); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (libel).
135 See, e.g., discussion of the clear and present danger doctrine in the text accompanying
notes 152-63 infra.
136 J. TEBBEL, supra note 84, at 74.
137 Id.
138 W. RIVERS, T. PETERSON & J. JENSEN, sufra note 77, at 89.
139 Id.
140 See genera4l' COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE
PRESS (1947); W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLE (1947).
141 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969).
142 See text accompanying notes 198-203 infra.
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to the community interest, can a proper balance be struck.' 43
If terrorism in this country reaches epidemic proportions, certain
adjustments in the social and legal systems may be inevitable. The Task
Force concluded that "[c]oping with terrorism will invariably mean
some inconvenience for the community, the curtailment of some free-
doms, and modifications upon the exercise of others."' 144 Thus the chal-
lenge posed by terrorism is to diminish this form of criminal activity by
means that minimize the intrusion upon individual freedoms. 145 It is
not here suggested that normal political and social evolution be discour-
aged, nor that the values implicit in free expression be lightly abrogated.
But the first amendment does not exist in a vacuum; the right to security
for both the individual and the collectivity is also of paramount impor-
tance. It would be anomalous if certain abuses were to undermine the
very system of constitutional self-government that a free press was
designed to guarantee. The solution lies to a large extent within the
larger problem of accommodating, within more comprehensive con-
structs of freedom and welfare, individual rights and social responsibili-
ties. A manufacturer, for example, is free to pursue profits subject to
such limitations as refraining from polluting the environment, produc-
ing harmful products, or engaging in predatory tactics to curtail compe-
tition. But the question in all such cases is one of delicate balance and
degree. The media enjoy extraordinary and valuable rights under the
first amendment. They should take an active role in the difficult process
of defining their correlative responsibilities. As Professor H. H. A.
Cooper has written,
If the media indeed contributes to the terrorist problem, it is not too much
to hope that it can also contribute to its solution. It cannot do so if its own
attitude is that the news ir the news is the news, nor can it do so if the attitude
of those, in either the public or private sector, who become media manag-
ers, is one of hysterical distrust bordering on paranoia. The terrorist has
simply seen. the chink in modern society's armour and is seeking, not un-
naturally to exploit that knowledge. . . .What the media needs is a sense
of proportion, and this cannot be acquired by government fiat anymore
than an individual can do so by such means. . . . Protection comes best
through alertness against danger. If the media can truly see itself as a part
of the problem it is well on the way to becoming an important part of the
solution. 146
143 DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, supra note 63, at 414.
14
4 Id.
145 See T. EMERSON, supra note 77, at 6-7.
146 Cooper, supra note 37, at 232. For articles in which it is concluded that media restric-
tions during terroristic events are of doubtful constitutionality, see Jones & Miller, The Media
and Terrorist Activity: Resolving the First Amendment Issue, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 70 (1979); Gun-





Despite their publicity objective, terroristic criminal acts, by them-
selves, clearly fall outside the sphere of constitutionally protected expres-
sion. Such acts are not properly "speech" at all, but rather "conduct"
causing harm without time or opportunity for speech in response.147
Acts of terror-violence thus may be proscribed subject only to minimal
due process scrutiny. Media reporting of terrorist attacks, on the other
hand, generally constitutes expression protected by the first amendment
since such coverage aims at informing and provides a basis for public
awareness and discussion of terrorism.
There are two basic types of governmental abridgment of speech
and press freedoms. First, content-based abridgments occur when gov-
ernment regulation aims at the communicative impact of the
message.148 Such regulation is presumptively unconstitutional unless
the government shows that the content of the message presents a clear
and present danger, the message is necessary to further a compelling
state interest, or otherwise falls within some narrow category of speech
not accorded first amendment protection.' 49 The second form of
abridgment occurs when the regulation is directed not at the message
conveyed, but rather at its noncommunicative impact or harmful ef-
fect.150 This form of regulation, one commentator has observed, is con-
stitutional "so long as it does not unduly constrict the flow of
information and ideas."' 51 Although the first amendment does not pro-
vide an absolute bar against government restriction in either case, the
significance of the distinction is that, while the government must bear
the burden of justifying content-based regulation, a balancing of the
competing interests involved ordinarily suffices for regulation that is
content-neutral.
The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
The formulation of first amendment jurisprudence by the United
147 Though the speech/conduct distinction has become somewhat outmoded and is of little
utility in constitutional analysis, its persistence has been attributed to the Supreme Court's
reluctance to rule "that the first amendment has any relevance whatsoever to political assassi-
nations, radical bank robberies, or other violent modes of expression." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsaTuTioNAI LAw 601 (1978). See United States v. O'Brien, 341 U.S. 367 (1968); United
States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966).
148 L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 580. See, e.g., Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 254
(1967); Miller v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254;
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
149 L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 581-84, 586, 602.
150 Id. at 580-81. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77.
151 L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 582.
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States Supreme Court began with a series of cases152 involving subver-
sive advocacy during World War I. In Schenck v. United States, 5 3 Justice
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, made it clear that the protec-
tion afforded speech is not absolute but "depends upon the circum-
stances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
panic."' 5 4 He proceeded to enunciate the clear and present danger test:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."'
155
Subsequent cases infused the clear and present danger doctrine
with the requirement of immediacy 5 6 between the pertinent speech and
threatened harm. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,157 the Court stated its most
recent formulation of the test:
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 158
The clear and present danger doctrine remains an essential element
of first amendment jurisprudence, perhaps even forming, as has been
suggested, 15 9 a framework for the Supreme Court's analysis of most ex-
pression attacked for its content. 6 Speech otherwise constitutionally
152 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
153 249 U.S. 47.
154 Id. at 52 (citations omitted).
155 Id. .
156 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
157 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
158 Id. at 447.
159 Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 76, at 1183-93.
160 The possibility of restraints on media coverage of terrorist events is likewise suggested
by analysis of questions of reconciling the first amendment with other substantive interests at
stake in (1) the civil law of libel, (2) the free press/fair trial issue, and (3) questions of national
security.
Libel laws protect the individual's interest in his good name and reputation, an interest
that the Court has described as "a basic concern." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169
(1979). Until New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, the Court classified libel as wholly
outside the sphere of protected speech. That case, however, established that libel "must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 269. Accordingly, the
Court has adopted a bifurcated analysis of such actions. Although private individuals may
recover for negligently inflicted defamatory falsehoods, public officials and public figures may
recover only upon showing that the defendant made the falsehood with "actual malice," i.e.,
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
.d. at 271-72. Thus, since the defendant's state of mind is crucial in any libel action, the
constitutional interest in free and open discussion must be balanced with the plaintiff's need
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protected may be suppressed under the doctrine if the following require-
ments are met: (1) the harm sought to be avoided is specific; (2) the
expression sought to be suppressed is likely to cause that harm; and
(3) the threatened harm is imminent. Although it has been persuasively
for discovery. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, the Court rejected the claim that the first
amendment precluded direct inquiry into the editorial process pertaining to an allegedly de-
famatory telecast. The court maintained that such a privilege would completely foreclose
establishing liability in such circumstances, id. at 171, and that even "[i]f such proof results in
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication of erroneous information
known to be false or probably false, this is no more than what our cases contemplate and does
not abridge either freedom of speech or of the press." Id. at 172.
The fair trial/free press issue entails accommodating the first amendment rights of the
press with the sixth amendment right of a criminal defendant to "a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Court had recognized that adverse
publicity can endanger the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial as far back as Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), which established that the trial judge has the affirma-
tive duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. See also Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965). Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), was the first case in
which the Court explicitly examined the conflict between first and sixth amendment interests.
Nebraska Press, however, involved the appeal of a lower court order prohibiting the reporting
of prejudicial news, a factual situation triggering the strong presumption against the constitu-
tional validity of prior restraints. A unanimous Court held that the gag order violated the
first amendment by preventing the press from publishing information already in its posses-
sion, although it refused to preclude the possibility that some threats to fair trial rights
"would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justify restraints." Id. at 569-70. Although
it would seem that "once a public hearing is held, the press may report it with impunity," L.
TRIBE, supra note 147, at 628, there is no correlative right of media access to closed hearings.
The Court recently held in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), that the
public generally, and the press in particular, have no constitutional right of access to pretrial
hearings where the parties in the litigation agree to closure in order to assure the accused's fair
trial rights. Furthermore, the decision suggests that any denial of access that is temporary
rather than absolute would have a lower burden of justification since the press retains the
opportunity, though delayed, "to inform the public of the details of the pretrial hearing accu-
rately and completely." Id. at 393.
A recent federal district court decision, United States v. The Progressive, 467 F. Supp.
990 (E.D. Wis. 1979), suggests a new approach in accommodating the first amendment with
national security interests. The Progressive, a magazine with a circulation of 40,000, intended
to publish an article allegedly revealing "The H-Bomb Secret," which it argued was obtained
from sources in the public domain. The government contended that technical details and
concepts contained in the article had never before been published in conjunction with one
another and that their disclosure presented an "immediate, direct, and irreparable harm to
the interests of the United States," id. at 991, 993, for which § 2274 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 permits suppression. In granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting publication,
the court noted that, although the article probably did not "provide a 'do-it-yourself' guide
for the hydrogen bomb," its publication could enable a "medium size nation to move faster in
developing a hydrogen weapon." Id. at 993. The court noted the "disparity of risk" between
a mistaken ruling that would "seriously infringe cherished First Amendment rights" and a
mistaken ruling that "could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that
event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot." Id. at 995-96.
If the government had not decided to drop its opposition to publication, affirmance on appeal
might have indicated that when the harm threatened is serious enough, although speculative,
the causal relationship ordinarily required between publication and the harm in order to
justify a prior restraint may be somewhat less proximate.
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argued that the clear and present danger doctrine would not permit reg-
ulation of violence televised for entertainment purposes, 16 1 the doctrine
would appear to provide a basis for regulating media reporting of terror-
ist incidents in at least three instances: first, where the terrorist attacks
are perceived as a "demonstrated risk of specific threats to the social
order"' 62 and no opportunity or time exists to respond to the informa-
tion disseminated; second, in those rare circumstances where a media
representative's remarks could be construed, in the context in which
they are uttered, as an incitement to lawless action; and third, where
media dissemination of specific information immediately jeopardized
the lives of hostages. In each of these circumstances, a compelling state
interest must outweigh countervailing first amendment values.
163
Prior Restraints
Near v. Minnesota 164 was the first case involving press censorship to
come before the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the
majority that since "the chief purpose of the first amendment's guaran-
tee is to prevent previous restraints upon publication,"' 65 a statute pro-
viding for the enjoinment of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory"1 66
newspapers and periodicals was an unconstitutional infringement of
press freedom. But the Chief Justice suggested that the prohibition
against prior restraint is not absolute:
[T]he protection even as to previous restraints is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. . . . No
one would question but that government might prevent actual obstruction
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary
requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.
The security of community life may be protected against incitements to
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The
constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force."'
67
161 Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 76, at 1193-96. In view of the inconclusive research
findings concerning the relationship between terrorist events and media coverage thereof,
that argument remains sound.
162 Id. at 1196.
163 See, e.g., Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1.
164 283 U.S. 697. On prior restraints in general, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427
U.S. 539.
165 283 U.S. at 713.
166 1925 Minn. Laws ch. 285, §§ 1-2.
167 283 U.S. at 716. The difficulty imposed on the state in showing the constitutional
validity of a prior restraint suggests why the United States has not ratified the Genocide
Convention which in article Il(c) prohibits "direct and public incitement to commit geno-
cide." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N.
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Forty years later in the Pentagon Papers Case, 168 the Supreme Court
rejected by six to three the government's effort to restrain the publica-
tion of classified materials on the Vietnam War. The Court held that
the government had failed to meet its "heavy burden of showing justifi-
cation," since "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional valid-
ity." 169
Thus, despite the strong presumption of unconstitutionality, prior
restraints may be constitutionally permissible where specific harm of a
grave nature would surely result from media dissemination of certain
information. Although general reporting of terrorism would lack the
contextual immediacy required to justify suppression, the same may not
be true during contemporaneous coverage of ongoing incidents, particu-
larly in hostage situations. Numerous scenarios are imaginable in which
prior restraints may be justified to save lives, as for example where the
perpetrators condition the lives of the hostages upon the media's dissem-
ination of, or restraint in disseminating, a particular statement or view-
point. Even though such demands could be tantamount to editorial
control, if the media refused, citing their first amendment freedoms, an
injunction compelling compliance may nevertheless issue)
70
GAOR, Res. 96(1), 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (Dec. 11, 1946). See Bassiouni, Genocide and)Racialeiscnm-
ination, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 522.
168 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). See also
United States v. The Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990, and note 160 supra.
169 403 U.S. at 713. Although the decision was initially evaluated as a decisive victory for
the press, subsequent analysis of the nine separate opinions indicates a contrary conclusion.
Of the six Justices who formed the majority, only Justices Black and Douglas urged that the
first amendment constitutes an absolute bar against prior restraint. Although espousing a
similar position, Justice Brennan refused to dismiss the possibility of an appropriate prior
restraint where there is "allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea." Id. at 726-27. It should be noted that the troopship exception, strictly con-
strued, does not require that the threatened harm be certain to follow from the publication;
what need be certain is merely an enhanced danger that the harm will occur. Disclosure of
the sailing date of a troopship, for example, does not guarantee that the ship will be sunk by
enemy action, but significantly increases the risk, always present, of its being sunk. For Jus-
tice Stewart prior restraint could be constitutionally permissible where disclosure "will surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." Id. at 730.
Likewise, Justice White, in concurrence, and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Harlan, and Justice
Blackmun, in dissent, could not subscribe to a doctrine of first amendment absolutism. Per-
haps Justice Blackmun captured the issue when he wrote: "[t]he First Amendment, after all,
is only one part of an entire Constitution. . . . What is needed here is a weighing, upon
properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow
right of the Government to prevent." Id. at 745.
170 The Hanafis, for example, demanded that the movie Mohammad, Messenger of 6od, cease
being shown and United Artists complied. For an interesting elaboration of the scenario had
the studio refused, see Bellows, Hj'ck'ng the Ist Amendment, MORE, June, 1977, at 16.
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Criminal and Civil Sanctions
In the Pentagon Papers Case, several Justices indicated that the
inappropriateness of prior restraint in that case would not immunize the
press from subsequent criminal prosecution. 171 Since criminal sanctions
prompt self-censorship by exposing the media to possible subsequent
punishment, and the defense of first amendment protection remains
available during the trial, 17 2 the content regulation involved in criminal
sanctions would not appear to bear as heavy a presumption of unconsti-
tutionality as prior restraints. Nonetheless, it has been established that
"First Amendment protection reaches beyond prior retraints." 173 To
sustain a constitutional attack, a criminal sanction punishing publica-
tion of "lawfully obtained, truthful information" after the event requires
(1) "the highest form of state interest," and (2) demonstration "that its
punitive action was necessary to further the state interests asserted."'
74
It seems possible that a narrowly drawn criminal statute punishing
media dissemination of information unnecessarily assisting the perpetra-
tors or jeopardizing the lives of hostages may withstand constitutional
scrutiny. The state interest in public safety during terrorist attacks is
compelling, and showing the required close nexus between the regula-
tory means chosen and the interest asserted does not appear insur-
mountable in the context of ongoing incidents. Since the precedents 175
dealing with content regulation by criminal sanction are few and distin-
guishable from the circumstances under discussion here, the constitu-
tional validity of such a criminal statute would largely depend upon the
factual context in which it is challenged and upon the precision with
which it is written, so as to withstand overbreadth, vagueness, and possi-
bly equal protection analysis.
Civil actions against the media by the victims of terrorist incidents
are a likely future development under the theory that media coverage
contributed to the harm they sustained. Three cases to date indicate
this new direction although in only one has a final decision been ren-
171 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 733 (White, J., concurring); id. at
730 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 720 ("Subsequent pun-
ishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional
privilege.").
172 See L. TRIBE, .ufira note 147, at 727.
173 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
174 Id.
175 Se, e.g., id. (holding that state interest insufficient to justify statute punishing publica-
tion ofjuvenile offender's identity, particularly where no provision for punishment for disclo-
sure by the electronic media); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding
criminal group libel law); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (holding criminal statute
punishing publications devoted to accounts of criminal deeds unconstitutionally vague, refus-
ing to decide the substantive first amendment issue).
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dered. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 176 the Court found a radio station
liable for the wrongful death of an individual killed when his car was
forced off the road by two teenagers pursuing a traveling disc-jockey
who had been giving away money pursuant to a contest in which the
station gave hints over the air as to his location. In Niemi v. National
Broadcasting Corporation, 177 the complaint alleged that the prime time tel-
ecast of "Born Innocent," a program depicting the rape of a young girl,
proximately caused a similar sexual assault four days later on the nine-
year-old plaintiff. A California appellate court reversed and remanded
the case following the trial court's dismissal for lack of deliberate incite-
ment of the attack. The third case, Kane v. National Broadcasting Corpora-
rin,178 has yet to be heard, but evidently the plaintiff brought the
action under the same theory as Niemi.
It remains questionable whether negligence actions based on the
media's alleged irresponsibility and recklessness will be deemed violative
of the media's first amendment rights. It is conceivable that in appro-
priate circumstances involving coverage of ongoing incidents, courts
may hold a medium liable for incitement to violence or even for inten-
tional infliction of harm under the legal principle that an individual
intends the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his actions.
Regulation Independent of Content
Restrictions as to time, place, and manner are general regulatory
statutes which further valid governmental interests wholly unrelated to
the content of the expression regulated.' 79 Regulation of the time,
place, and manner of protected expression is subject to a weighing of the
respective interests involved and is constitutionally permissible, even
though the indirect result is to constrict the flow of information or
ideas, 80 provided that the governmental purpose is not attainable by
less restrictive alternatives.' 8 1 On this basis, government may seek to
impose limitations on the use of live coverage during ongoing terrorist
incidents, on the use of certain obtrusive lighting and equipment, or
perhaps even on the contemporaneous reporting of certain details
presenting a clear and present danger to life and effective law enforce-
ment management. Limiting in these ways the mode of presentation of
176 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1976).
177 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
178 No. 77 Civ. Ct. 1193 (S.D.N.Y.).
179 See note 129 supra. Usually cited in support of non-content regulation of speech is
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. See also Ely, Fag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing hn First Amendment Anaysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978).
180 L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 682.
181 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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terrorist incidents arguably would not prohibit media dissemination of
the information in alternate forms.
Access restrictions to the scene of ongoing terrorist attacks would
raise the issue of the media's news gathering rights under the first
amendment. In Branzburg v. Hayes,'82 the Court held that newsmen
summoned before grand juries conducting good faith criminal investiga-
tions cannot claim even a qualified testimonial privilege, even though
the identity of confidential sources would be revealed by compelling
their testimony. Although recognizing that "without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of press could be eviscerated," 183 the
Court rejected the claim that the burden on news gathering outweighed
the public interest in obtaining the information and noted that the Con-
stitution does not guarantee the press special access to information not
available to the public generally:
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regu-
larly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the
meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the
meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right
of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is ex-
cluded. '
8 4
Subsequent to Branzburg, the press presented new demands for af-
firmative rights of access to, inter alia, government reports, congressional
galleries, and official press conferences.185 In Pell v. Procunier 18 6 and Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 187 the Court rejected challenges to prohibitions of
182 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (denying media
access to prisons). Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (right
of access to criminal trials).
183 408 U.S. at 681.
184 Id. at 684-85. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), in which the Supreme Court
rejected appellant's argument that the denial by the Secretary of State of his application for a
travel permit to Cuba violated, among other rights, his first amendment right to the free
exchange of ideas and information. Justice Warren, writing for the majority, noted that
"[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather infor-
mation." Id. at 17. A California court has stated:
Restrictions on the right of access to particular places at particular times are consistent
with other reasonable restrictions on liberty based upon the police power, and these re-
strictions remain valid even though the ability of the press to gather news and express
views on a particular subject may be incidentally hampered.
Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d 448, 455, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605,
610 (1970).
185 See, e.g., Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir.
1973); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Hawaii 1974); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768
(M.D. Ala. 1973); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents'
Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973); Washington Post v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770
(D.D.C. 1972); McMullen v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973), appeal dismissed
for want of substantial federal question, 415 U.S. 970 (1974).
186 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
187 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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personal interviews between newsmen and inmates of state and federal
prisons. The Court held that since the restrictions did not "deny the
press access to sources of information available to members of the gen-
eral public,"18 8 no violations of the media's first amendment rights were
involved. Following the direction of Branzburg, the Court concluded
that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded the general public,"' 8 9 and that the first
amendment guarantee of press freedom does not "require the govern-
ment to accord the press special access to information not shared by
members of the public generally."' 9° Consistent with these develop-
ments, therefore, the courts could deny the media access to scenes of
terrorist events, since the public typically is banned from those sites.
The Special Status of Broadcasting
The broadcasting industry is regulated by the Communications Act
of 1934,191 which empowers the Federal Communications Commission
to grant renewable three-year broadcasting licenses on the basis of a
"public interest, convenience, or necessity"' 192 standard. Section 3(h)
provides that licensees "shall not . . . be deemed a common carrier,"'
193
while section 326 declares that the FCC has no "power of censorship,
nor power to interfere with the right of free speech."'
94
Although broadcasters have strenuously argued that the first
amendment has equal applicability to their medium under section 326,
the Supreme Court has declined to recognize any "unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individ-
ual to speak, write or publish." 9 5 Judicial precedent 196 lends support to
government regulation of broadcasting in three ways. First, FCC licens-
ing procedures permit consideration of past and prospective program-
ming in determining whether the renewal or grant of a license is
consistent with the public interest, convenience, or necessity. 197 Second,
statutory prohibitions and FCC rules include (1) a ban on obscenity and
188 417 U.S. at 835.
189 Id. at 834.
190 Id.
191 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970). For a discussion of the special status of the broadcast
media, see generally L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 696-700.
192 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309 (1970).
193 Id. § 153(h).
194 Id. § 326.
195 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). See also FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("Of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection.").
196 See Albert, Consitutional Regulation of Telezised Violence, 64 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1318-19 &
n.107 (1978).
197 See id. at 1319-27.
[Vol. 72
TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA
profanity, 198 (2) the equal time provision which requires that, when one
candidate for public office is permitted to use broadcast time, all candi-
dates for that office must be offered equal opportunities, 199 (3) the fair-
ness doctrine which requires licensees "to afford reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting views of issues of public importance,
200
and (4) standards against deliberate distortion or bias in news program-
ming and documentaries. 20 1 Finally, the FCC encourages industry self-
regulation by issuing policy statements, letters of advice, and repri-
mands.
Various rationales exist for the differential first amendment treat-
ment afforded broadcasting: public ownership of the airwaves, the
unique power of the medium, spectrum scarcity, and the medium's per-
vasiveness and intrusiveness. 20 2 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
203
Justice White, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, observed that,
while broadcasting is "affected by a First Amendment interest," 204 the
relative scarcity of frequencies in comparison to the demand for them
permits the government 20 5 "to put restraints on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. . . . It
is the right of viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount. '20 6 In FCC v. Pacfka Foundation,207 upholding the
FCC's authority to proscribe the broadcast of an indecent monologue,
the Court employed a new rationale based on two characteristics of
broadcasting: Its "uniquely pervasive presence" 20 8 and the presence of
unsupervised children in the audience.20 9 Although the holding in
Paqfca was a narrow one and has met with criticism,210 it nevertheless
provides a new justification for affording broadcasting limited first
amendment protection particularly when new technologies may soon
obviate the scarcity rationale.
211
198 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
199 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
200 Id.
201 See Albert, supra note 196, at 1335-37.
202 See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 76, at 1221-35.
203 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of the fairness doctrine).
204 Id. at 386.
205 Id. at 388.
206 Id. at 390.
207 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
208 Id. at 748.
209 Id. at 749.
210 See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 76, at 1280-88. See also Note, First Amendment-
Obscenity and Indecenc, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 474 (1978); Note, Keeping the Airwaves Safe for
Indecen-Padfa Foundation v. Federal Communications Commission, 27 DE PAUL L. Rsv. 155
(1977).
211 See generaly Brown, Telvision v. Progress, SATURDAY REv., Sept. 16, 1978, at 24.
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C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
While intended as an agenda for discussion and not as a blueprint
for government action, the foregoing analysis indicates that potential
government regulators would not lack a constitutional basis for impos-
ing at least some restrictions on media reporting of terrorist incidents,
particularly in hostage-taking situations. Court orders restraining me-
dia personnel may be obtainable where, presenting a clear and present
danger to the lives of hostages and law enforcement personnel, media
coverage would disseminate such information as (1) possible escape
routes for hostages, (2) the location of potential hostages whose wherea-
bouts appear unknown to the terrorists, (3) the deployment and tactics
of law enforcement personnel to capture the terrorists and free the hos-
tages, and (4) the strategies of police negotiators. Although the constitu-
tional validity of specific proposals for direct media regulation would
depend on whether the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary and
the state interest sufficiently compelling, indirect regulation-such as
access restrictions or FCC action-would probably face lesser constitu-
tional objections. In light of the foregoing constitutional analysis, how-
ever, it is preferable that the media either adopt their own guidelines to
regulate the conduct of their members or, in the alternative, adopt a
licensing procedure which entails such graduated sanctions as repri-
mands, suspension, and revocation depending upon the gravity of the
violation as measured by the harm to hostages and the causal connec-
tion between such harm and media reporting. The failure of the media
to regulate themselves in the context of terror-violence could result in
greater governmental regulation and harsher sanctions.
212
The constitutional issues presented by media reporting during ter-
rorist incidents remain untested in the courts. Since a vigorous and in-
dependent press is essential to the functioning of democratic
government, the media should arguably play an adversarial role with
respect to civil authority. Democratic institutions work best, however,
when there is provision for flexibility and forbearance on each side. Any
direct collision over first amendment freedoms would merely shift the
problem to a higher conflict of values213 and postpone steps toward the
prevention and control of terror-violence. Consequently, the public in-
terest can only suffer, and the terrorist's objective be aided, should active
enmity characterize media-government relations.
Any comprehensive solution to the problems presented by the me-
212 Again, it is emphasized that no proposal is advanced here concerning media coverage
of general incidents of violence. Suggested guidelines are limited to coverage of ongoing ter-
roristic incidents posing grave danger of harm to hostages.
213 Terror Violence, supra note 1, at 764.
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dia's vulnerability to terrorist manipulation must take into considera-
tion at least five competing interests: (1) the public's basic right to be
informed through a free press; (2) the safety and well-being of hostages;
(3) the public's need for effective law enforcement response; (4) the de-
terrence and prevention of future terroristic crime; and (5) the need to
respect the privacy of victims. 2 14 Although the complexity of terror-vio-
lence factual settings frequently precludes absolute priorities among
these interests, the parameters of a solution are clear. An absolute ban
on media coverage of ongoing incidents is clearly unacceptable despite
the fact that any coverage represents a concession to the publicity objec-
tive of the terrorist;215 such a ban could promote exaggerated word-of-
mouth rumors, impair the public credibility of both the media and civil
authority, and may encourage potential terrorists to devise even more
spectacular attacks that cannot be ignored. On the other hand, concern
for human life should outweigh competitive urge. Although the public
must be informed about occurrences of terrorist attacks, the public's
right to know may be satisfied in certain instances by less than full dis-
closure of all particulars concerning those incidents. Only cooperation
and understanding between the media and the police can frustrate the
publicity objective of terroristic crime.
216
Since the media and law enforcement both act in the public inter-
est, voluntary cooperation, based on affirmative duties, should be possi-
ble. Both media managers and law enforcement officials, however, must
exercise judgment, restraint, and sensitivity with respect to the obliga-
tions and difficulties of the other, in addition to their own. As the Task
Force on Disorders and Terrorism recommends, law enforcement offi-
cials should endeavor to maximize the media's access to reliable, accu-
rate information, since generally "it is more-and more balanced
coverage-rather than less coverage that will best promote both crime
prevention and public confidence in law enforcement. '217 Thus police
should establish a media information center as near to the site of an
ongoing incident as practicable. Such a center would facilitate the re-
lease of official information and provide a centralized location where
media personnel can verify information as well as be apprised of the
detrimental potential of specific reportage. The media, on the other
hand, must recognize that "in a relatively small number of situations
involving extraordinary violence, where emergency conditions exist or
where a criminal objective would be furthered by press coverage, argu-
214 Se Mann, Personnel and Poperty of Tranmlaional Corporatiots, in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra
note 1.
215 DISORDERS AND TERRORISM, supra note 63, at 238.
216 Id. at 185.
217 Id. at 237.
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ments in favor of temporary, limited, but effective regulation of the me-
dia should be given weight.12 18 It is generally recognized, however, that
necessary or appropriate restraints in the timing, content, or techniques
of coverage are best left to the determination of those who make news
decisions.
2 19
The media have demonstrated increasing awareness that during
terrorist incidents they must balance their responsibility to provide full
and fair coverage with their responsibility not to increase the threat to
life and impede effective law enforcement. After the Hanafi Muslim
incident, for example, The National News Council offered to become a
clearinghouse for internal guidelines prepared by news organizations.
220
Among the first to formulate written guidelines for coverage of terror-
ist/hostage situations were four major news organizations--CBS News,
the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times, the Chicago Sun- Times and Daily
News, and United Press International. Other organizations subse-
quently followed, some no doubt prompted by a solicitation of media
views in October, 1978, by Representative Don Edwards, Chairman of
The Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. Most guidelines
share a number of characteristics. First, they adopt a flexible approach
emphasizing case-by-case determination of the newsworthiness of the
event, the use of balance and restraint, and the avoidance of sensational-
ism. Most attempt to avoid affording the terrorist an unedited platform,
often suggesting that the demands be paraphrased. The guidelines sug-
gest that media personnel avoid becoming participants or intermediaries
in terrorist situations. Most provide for greater control over coverage by
senior news executives, particularly with regard to the use of live broad-
casts. None of the guidelines, however, prohibit media personnel from
directly contacting the terrorists for interviews or by telephone. Curi-
ously, most of the guidelines reiterate the basic principles of professional
journalism-accuracy, balance, common sense-and thereby suggest, as
one commentator has remarked, "an embarassing question: Shouldn't
218 Id.
219 The role of the news media in terrorist incidents has come to the attention of the Sub-
committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary. In
its Staff Report on Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism, the need for voluntary
self-restraint on the part of the media was recognized:
Government officials, law enforcement officers and media representatives generally un-
derstand the need to develop voluntary flexible guidelines for news coverage of a terrorist
incident. The development of voluntary guidelines would foster a mutual understanding
between the media and law enforcement, thereby serving both the media's pursuit of the
news and law enforcement's duty to maintain order and preserve human life and prop-
erty.
STAFF REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., FEDERAL CAPABILITIES IN CRISIS MAN-
AGEMENT AND TERRORISM 15-16 (Comm. Print 1979).
220 N.Y. Times, March 23, 1977, § 2, at 4, col. 2.
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journalists ask themselves how these basics sometimes get shoved aside,
ignored or forgotten when they're most necessary?" 22 1 Furthermore, the
guidelines adopted so far do not attempt to resolve the essential problem
posed by media coverage: how to avoid the media becoming the in-
ducement for or instrument of terroristic crime.
A comprehensive solution might involve the following recommen-
dations:
1. Tining: The media should delay reporting details that could inflame
or aggravate an incident, particularly information that could provide
terrorists with valuable intelligence. Such information need not be
permanently suppressed, merely delayed until after the danger has
passed.
222
2. Balance: The amount of coverage afforded an incident should be in
proportion to its objective news values. In covering a specific incident,
the media should provide factual background reports of terrorism gen-
erally and appropriate follow-up coverage of the consequences to the
victims and perpetrators. The media should balance dissemination of
information about the perpetrators with information about the official
response to them. Sensationalism and excessive publicity should be
avoided, particularly with respect to propaganda demands and live
interviews. The media should avoid speculative reporting and unveri-
fied casualty figures and rumors. Disclosure of "how-to" aspects and
specific law enforcement strategies and tactical capabilities should be
minimized to prevent aiding terrorists in planning future attacks.
3. Cooperation: Media personnel should attempt to cooperate with police
and other news organizations in order to minimize abuses arising from
unrestrained competition. Reporters and equipment should be pooled
when practicable to minimize obtrusiveness and burdens on law en-
forcement personnel. In cases of extraordinary violence, a metropoli-
tan committee of editors and news directors should be constituted with
authority to promulgate additional restraints as may be required. To
facilitate dissemination of accurate information, media supervisory
personnel should make themselves available to law enforcement offi-
cials, and enforcement agencies should train some officers to deal spe-
cifically with the problem of public information.
4. Non-intervention: Media personnel should avoid becoming a party to
the negotiation process and should curtail direct contact with perpe-
trators during ongoing incidents. Qualified news personnel may un-
dertake direct contact with the perpetrators after resolution of the
incident only upon the express authorization of senior news executives
and after consultation with appropriate authorities so as not to inter-
fere with police communications, incite the perpetrator by particular
221 Czerniejewski, Guidelines for the Coverage of Terrorism, QuILL, July-Aug., 1977, at 23.
222 This recommendation would have particular value in protecting targets highly vulner-
able to extensive public injury if successfully attacked. The most obvious example is, of
course, nuclear power plants. In that context, the media should at least refrain from divulg-
ing information until law enforcement officials receive notice of the danger and have reason-
able opportunity to rectify the problem.
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questions or phrasing, or vitiate police efforts to minimize harm to per-
sons or property.
5. Education: Media coverage should emphasize the following: (a) resort
to terroristic violence is contrary to social values and has a low
probability of success; (b) police must operate under the drastic practi-
cal handicap of minimizing harm to persons and property in relation
to terror-violence; (c) police personnel take the same risks as those
taken by terrorists; and (d) society is not helpless with respect to terror-
violence, but rather acts within a certain legal framework. The media
should provide access for the voices of reason among dissident groups
in order to minimize the need to resort to violence. Various tertiary
institutions should promote responsible media coverage through con-
tinuing professional education of media personnel, professional codes
and associations, and periodic conferences between law enforcement
officials and media policymakers to facilitate the frank exchange of
views and concerns.
With respect to the electronic media, another area for self-regula-
tion is that of media control over the content of broadcasts and the reali-
zation of the terrorists' objective of dissemination. That problem was
evident in the Gallegos interview discussed above. Both ABC and CBS
satisfactorily regulated their own conduct while NBC abdicated its re-
sponsibility by permitting the Iranians to control the media with little
discernable benefit to the public.
223
Some of these proposals are not alien to the traditional exercise of
self-restraint now practiced by the United States media. Cooperation
between the media and civil authority is not without precedent, as evi-
denced by kidnapping cases since the 1931 Lindbergh case and by
events during World War II. Other proposals may require adjustment
in the traditional role of journalism as an objective reporter of events.
Such claims to impartiality, however, do not insulate the media from
becoming the instrument of terroristic crime. As Professor Jaehnig ex-
plains:
The problem lies in journalism's moral neutrality posture, which prohibits
the development of an ethic oriented toward the maintenance of the com-
munity, its standards, values and culture. Traditions that prescribe an in-
flexible "watchdog" role for the press, or emphasize the publication of
terrorist rhetoric when the community itself feels intimidated, appear self-
defeating. Clearly judgments must be made by journalists that differenti-
ate between wars of ideas fought within legitimated institutions of the
community, and struggles fought outside these institutions and which rely
upon violence rather than verbiage, intimidation instead of intellect. As
one journalist argues: "When hate propagandists and apostles of violence
attack the democratic body politic, the journalist must be more than a
passive channel of communication. He has got to be a crusader for a cli-
223 See notes 97-103 & accompanying text szuora.
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mate of reason in-which ordered liberty and due process can work."
224
Thus the time is ripe to discuss a more active role for the media in
handling terror-violence coverage. The media's failure to take the initi-
ative would only exacerbate existing conflicts and invite the search for
more restrictive alternatives. It bears repeating, however, that in socie-
ties where freedom of the press is nonexistent or strictly controlled, the
problems discussed herein do not occur. In those societies it is usually
the state that engages in or sponsors terror-violence. A free and respon-
sible media is an indispensable element of democracy. And without de-
mocracy no society can be free and no individual can be assured the
essential guarantees of human justice.
224 Jaehnig,Jounaid s and Trorism. Captives of the Libertarian Tradition, 53 IND. LJ. 717, 743
(1978).
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